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ABSTRACT
As said by Michael E. Porter in the preface of his book, Competitive Advantage:
Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, "the success or failure of any firm depends
on competitive advantage-delivering the product at lower cost or offering unique benefits to
the buyer that justify a premium price." In an industry as large and competitive as a ours this
represents an immense challenge. How exactly can this knowledge be transferred to the
construction industry in a way that will help us improve a system that is failing to provide a
efficient environment for the delivery of capital projects.
This research examines the current practice of contractual risk shifting between the classical
tri-partite arrangement of Design-Bid-Build, as well as in more recent approaches to the
problem, such as Design-Build and Construction Management. The study considers in detail
the relationships between degree of exposure, strength of negotiation and project complexity.
Two models were developed for this research. First, the Venture Risk Analysis Model
(VRAM) is used as framework to analyze current project delivery systems with the purpose
of providing proof to the underlying concept that a reversal in the risk aversion tendency will
not only improve delivery, but also strengthen the eroded position of design professionals in
our industry. After a study of risk allocation current practices, a second model is developed
from the application of the various concepts discussed. The Single Liability Insurance Model
(SLIM), is proposed as a new option to solving the current problems in contractual risk
allocation and the increasing costs of insurance coverage.
As legal costs and liability litigation rise, we must understand and face the fact that our
reliance on outmoded allocations of project risk has lead to unrealistic expectations which
have only added to the problems of an industry plagued with disappointment and disputes.
Lawyer's use of exculpatory language in contract documents, in order to keep owners,
contractors and designers at arm's length, has been extremely damaging to the industry. By
establishing adversarial relationships among the participants in an industry that is inherently
full of unknowns, we have not only damaged the industry and its professionals, but has also
limited its advancement by hampering incentives for innovation.
Design professionals, ever more aware of legal implications, have stepped away from many
of the services they used to provide. As legal considerations become more important than
other aspects of their business, professionalism is slowly obscured. As design professionals
limit their services to reduce liability, their ability to stay up to date with new technologies
and change decreases. As project complexity increases with the push of outside technologies
and performance requirements, the professional differentiation promoted by risk shedding has
given birth to a new generation of consultants with deep technical ability but limited scope of
expertise.
By designing and implementing delivery methods which can promote team
participation through shared profit and risk, everyone involved in the delivery of capital
projects will have a better incentive to cooperate. Through increased cooperation, not only
will the industry benefit, but designers will have the opportunity to gain a more active
position. Only then, when designers have this, will they be able to reinforce what today is an
increasingly eroded position in the value system.
Thesis Supervisor: Charles Helliwell
Title: Senior Lecturer
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I. Introduction
1.1 Changing Trends in Project Delivery
As society moves forward, the constant adaptation to market pulls and technology
push continually serves as a catalyst for innovation. The construction industry is no different
than any other market sector, and as society moves ahead, it must continually adapt to
changing conditions. Yet, we have an industry which appears not to have changed much in the
memory span of anyone reading this thesis. Some might argue this is not true. Materials,
computers, equipment, all are examples of the areas were great change has been achieved. Yet
the industry is still perceived by many as an archaic dinosaur stuck in the ways of the past.
The problems exist not in the incorporation of new technology into the process, but in the
evolution of the process itself. The changes seen by the industry, with few recent exceptions,
have been mostly influenced by the pressure from outside sectors which affect project
delivery.
The real problem lies not in the components of the product, but in the methods used to
incorporate and manage the wide array of parts that encompass the delivery of the final
product. It was not until fairly recently, that a second look was taken at how industry
provides and delivers it services. The construction industry is now beginning to react to the
pressures of an increasingly complex environment. As other industries move ahead,
optimizing their process and continually creating a flow of new technology to be incorporated
into our infrastructure, the construction industry must play catch up to the rest of the
market.
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As the industry grew in the United States, it developed a series of pre-defined ways in which
things were "supposed" to be done. Statutes, regulations, contracts and the common law all
regulate a process under a set of outdated premises. As the industry struggles to change,
many excellent ideas are blocked by a framework that it, and not the lawyers created. The
industry, and specially designers, have created a web of regulation that is backfiring. As
professionals step away from the process because of an overwhelming fear of legal
exposure, the are not only hurting their profession, but also adding to the sub-optimization of
a process which already is failing to provide adequate services to a client who has ever
increasing demands and diminishing construction knowledge.
The roles of the three basic players in the industry have not only changed, but are
continuing to change even as this document is written. Corporate restructuring, "rightsizing,"
or downsizing (or whatever terminology describes the changing role of corporate engineering
departments) is having strong effects on the industry, not only affecting the owner but also
the other two. Large companies have in many cases completely eliminated in-house corporate
engineering departments. As this happens, the contractor is pressured by circumstances that
will increase his responsibility for the planning and execution of mayor capital construction
projects. As owners have less control over the execution of capital construction projects,
they are looking for ways to shed their increased risk position, through acquiring services
with single source responsibility. As this happens, more and more designers are becoming a
part of construction company teams.
Another effect of corporate restructuring has been the evolution of corporate
organizational branches with increasing power and involvement in capital planning expansion
9
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programs. Because of the very nature of these groups, construction is required to provide
services to people which have little or no previous experience in construction and thus lack
capabilities to determine if projects are being planned, executed or managed properly.
A third consequence of corporate capital restructuring affecting the industry has been
the creation of strategic alliances. As the competitive environment becomes more complex,
and companies continue to streamline their operations, new alliances are providing challenges
for the industry, specially in contracting strategies. Alliances with suppliers are forcing design
services that were previously provided by the owner, to be the responsibility of the supplier.
This, combined with increasing demand for design services to be provided by the contractor,
are only some of the many drivers for change affecting the industry and its participants.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
1.2.1 Overview of the Work
The issues explored through this document are based on an incremental process
designed to build the reader's awareness and understanding of a set of problems and
conditions which are critical to the conveyance of its intent.
The first two chapters provide the author's perspective on current problems and
inefficiencies in capital project delivery. These chapters are key to the validation and
understanding of the theoretical framework underlying the work. After this, the third chapter
gives an in depth explanation of VRAM, developed in order to provide an easy to use tool to
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simply portray what can sometimes be very complex inter-relationships between parties. In
order to determine the role that certain decisions regarding risk imply for the overall level of
exposure of project participants, VRAM is used in chapter four to perform an analysis of
typical risk allocation practices over various organizations. Because it is critical to the
purpose of this work to provide a clear understanding of the implications of risk aversion
tendencies for different organizations, the analysis performed in chapter four through the use
of the Venture Risk Analysis Model instrumental to understanding the proposals made in
chapter five..
Chapters two, three and four are the building blocks for the model explained in
chapter five, The Single Liability Insurance Model (SLIM). This chapter is the heart of the
research as it provides not a mapping of the problems, but a mapping of the solutions.
The concepts presented in all of the chapters, are the result of a combination of ideas
developed through the analysis of professional and research literature, and nine interviews
with professionals in the areas of design, construction, insurance, and public works. While
informal communication was maintained with other parties, the more formal interviews were
as follow:
2 Contractors
2 Architects
2 Consulting firms (A/E's)
1 Construction Manager
1 Public Agency
1 Insurance Broker
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1.2.2 Risk Acquisition Benefits
The work performed here is meant to demonstrate that there are indeed ways to
control risk and not be controlled by it. With the help of the Venture Risk Analysis Model
and the Single Liability Insurance Model, this thesis will hopefully open eyes to new
opportunities in risk management. Yet, not only do I want to demonstrate that risk
acquisition (under the right circumstances) can be beneficial, but I want to show that it can
also be profitable.
1.2.2 The Author's Motivation
Trained both as an architect and an engineer in a combined program of five years at
Tulane University in New Orleans (1995), I became highly aware of the problems faced by
architects in the industry. In the search to become a better designer, I thought I not only had
to know design, or engineering, but know how things are really built. From personal
experience, I felt that architects (with few exceptions) generally tend to neglect many of a
complex set of conditions which all play an equally important role in the delivery of any
capital facility.
In my desire to know more about construction I came to the Center for Construction
Research in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. As I went through my studies at
MIT, I found that the problems which I thought were only typical of architects, were indeed
shared at various levels by the whole industry. In a desire to find a solution to the dilemma,
this research was initiated. While I know my life will be dedicated to improving this industry
which I love, I sincerely hope my work will push others to do the same.
12
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1.3 The Move Away from Risk
1.3.1 Pressures from a Changing Market
Together with the trends affecting the key players in the industry, there is also a
series of changes which have affected the characteristics of the projects themselves. Looking
back, we see the 1930's as a period for expansion. The Great Depression pushed forward the
development of mega-projects like the Hoover Dam in Nevada and the Grand Coulee Dam in
the State of Washington. Yet as the years went by, the construction industry changed
slowly. Though the 1940's, 50's ,60's, 70's and 80's saw the development of large projects
like the interstate highway program, nuclear powerplants, the growth of the air travel
industry and the development of the computer and service industry, the projects of the 90's
are considerably smaller in both financial and engineering aspects. Remodeling and re-
utilization of previously constructed sites is far more common than the greenfield project
which was common only a decade ago.
Large construction companies are facing difficulties never encountered before. In the last
decades, the competition for overseas markets was minimal. The US could come in with their
expertise and easily dominate them. Today, as many companies are finding out, this is no
longer the case.
As mentioned by Dr. J.K. Yates from the University of Colorado at Boulder, the last
decade saw the share of the Gross National Product contributed by the United States
construction industry drop from approximately 11 percent, to almost 7 percent.' In 1980,
1 J.K. Yates. "International Competitiveness of U.S. Construction Firms," Project Management Journal March
1991
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US construction firms acquired 46 percent of the international market. Comparing this to the
market share of overseas contracts for 1994, which constituted only 16.1 percent of all
international contracts, there was a drop to less than half of the market share of a decade ago.2
Table 1.1 Comparative Market Share 1991/1994
CONTRACTORS INTL. REVENUE 1991 MARKET 1994 MARKET POPULATION MARKET SHARE!# OF FIRMS POPULATION
NATIONALITY $ mil. SHARE SHARE (millions) 1994
Canadian 2 156.2 7.0% 0.2% 56 0.17
European 87 48,640.4 41.2% 52.7% 55 0.13
British 12 11,411.5 15.4% 12.4% 25 0.00
German 17 10,169.7 6.6% 11.0% 12 0.55
French 9 11,614.8 9.4% 12.6% 61 0.05
Italian 21 7,543.0 1.9% 8.2% 119 0.04
Dutch 5 3,302.6 5.3% 3.6% 14 0.00
Other 23 4,598.8 2.6% 5.0% 6 0.32
26: .4%
Chinese 22 2,901.4 1.9% 3.1% 5 0.38
Korean 10 2,951.7 2.3% 3.2% 57 0.05
All other 26 3,946.3 6.9% 4.3% N/A N/A
All firms 225 92,231.4 100.0% 649
Source : Project Management Journal March 1991 & ENR August 28, 1994
A series of conditions is affecting the position of US firms in the International Market. The
world economy, financing and government intervention are all factors affecting firms. The
international problems faced by the industrial sector are blamed on a "noncompetitive set of
policies and institutions (U.S. government) or misalignment of fiscal policy, which has lead to
budget deficits, high interest rates, and overvalued dollar." Interest rates are a main concern.
As Yates explains, "an interest rate advantage of one-half of a percentage point is equivalent
to a 5 percent edge in price (European/Japanese firms offer financial packages with two
percentage points lower than the United States which results in a 20 percent advantage in
2 Gary J. Tulacz, The Top 225 International Contractors, ENR August 28 1994 &
J.K. Yates. "International Competitiveness of U.S. Construction Firms," Project Management Journal
March 1991
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price)"3 . On another plane, many blame U.S. government policies against subsidies for the
decline. There has always been a feeling among construction industry participants, that tax
laws, and regulatory processes of the U.S. government inhibit the ability of U.S. construction
firms to compete effectively in foreign markets4 . European and Asian governments have
developed mixed financial packages in which the government makes from 50 to a 100 percent
loans at very low or zero interest. Together with this, governments of European nations offer
subtler forms of aid to their domestic construction industry, like contractor's inflation
insurance and foreign exchange insurance. Still, though the United States is faced with
economic and policy problems, blaming them as the sole source of disadvantage would be
unrealistic.
Putting the blame on micro or macro-economic financial , political or policy factors is
only looking at the easiest way to blame the problem on some body else. Though it is true
that US construction firms are competing not only against international competitors, but also
against rising interest rates, uneven international practices and a fluctuating dollar; its
important to understand that the decline of US firms is equally or more influenced by other
factors. As mentioned before, and as will be reinforced throughout this thesis, the success or
failure of participants lies not only in conditions like the ones previously mentioned but on
the means by which the service is provided. The construction industry is at a point were it
must react and change. As Yates says, there are many options for regaining the competitive
edge the industry once had. We have the technology, the resources and the people to do it.
3 Project Management Journal March 1991
4 Project Management Journal March 1991
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All we need is the willingness to see ahead and understand that things must change so that our
industry will be able to jump ahead of the competition.
1.3.2 The Increased Legal Exposure
Legal exposure has become a guiding concern in the building environment of today.
From its beginning almost two centuries ago in England, negligence has slowly dominated the
law of civil liability. It was not long ago when the English common law recognized differences
between duties owed as the result of mutual consent ("contract") and duties arising as a
matter of public policy to act with the reasonable care, skill and diligence so as not to injure
others ("negligence").5 Blackstone's Commentaries, a popular legal Treatise for Britain and
the Colonies which was published in 1776, established the framework from which the
concept of negligence developed to what it is today. As explained in the document, the action
which today it's referred to as negligence, is derived from:
"contracts implied by reason and construction law, " that "arise upon the
supposition that everyone who undertakes any office, employment, trust or
duty, contracts, with those who employ or entrust him, to perform it with
integrity, diligence, and skill. And, if by want of either of those qualities, any
injuries accrues to individuals, they have therefore their remedy in damages by
a special action on the case. "6
Though much time has passed since the development of this document, the A/E of
today continues to face a seemingly uncontrollable sea of uncertainty that contractual
customization has failed to resolve. Technology keeps on moving ahead and nobody seems to
5 Architect/Engineer Liability Trough the Year 2000 (Is it Absolute???). January 31,1992
6 Commentaries, III, Blackstone, PP. 163-5.
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know how to get a grip on the problem. Courts and non A/E's clients continue to
misunderstand the role of the different players in the industry, and specially that of A/E's.
Creating more and more specific contracts has only caused more and more specific claims. As
A/E's look for ways to clarify these misconceptions through contractual customization,
courts have slowly made them not forget that they are the professionals on any site.
In this lies the essence of this research. As most practitioners are finding out, now
neither can they hide from the responsibilities inherent to their respective professional
practices, nor can they exert today, the level of control necessary to efficiently deal with the
problems the industry is facing. The industry has created a web of regulation that is being
forced to fit in an environment that is no longer the same.
1.3.3 Industry Fragmentation
One of the main and most detrimental consequences of the adversarial relationship
created by the use of exculpatory language in contract documents has been the gradual
fragmentation of the construction industry. The industry, in essence, has turned into a place
where the us versus them and the adversarial approach has flourished for many years, but at a
great cost to all who are directly or indirectly related to it. The contracting process has
become a lengthy, complicated and expensive system in which project schedules more often
than not become unduly long.
In 1976, Moavenzadeh and Rossow described the industry's fragmentation as one
which gives firms flexibility and makes regrouping of participants reasonably feasible, which
in turn, helps lessen the necessity for contraction and expansion of individual firms as they
17
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adjust to the frequent changes in the type and level of construction demand. Still today, with
a faster pace of technological change, fragmentation is working against an industry which it
was once able to help.
Many organizations are aware of these problems and are looking for solutions. Still,
most are too quick to point to the legal community for the development of solutions. For
example, the report for the American Bar Association's Forum on the Construction Industry
states, and I quote:
"Now we're attempting to re-tool the lawyers. We're revamping the project environment in an
attempt to create a win-win situation for everyone involved. The legal community again is key
to seeing that such an opportunity is there."7
Yet, even though the CII (Construction Industry Institute) refers to the legal community as
KEY to the creation of a win-win situation for all involved in project delivery, they soon
come closer to one of the main ideas driving this research8 . Dr. Richard Tucker, Director of
CII made the following remarking in a report on that topic,
'partnering, incentive contracting, strategic alliances: the task of bridging differences and
identifying commonalties now comes to the forefront. What we must do is focus on the things
that make successful projects. The problems are still there to be solved, but our approach
must be different. First, we must better communicate our ideas and our values, those things
that can help us be mutually successful. "9
Fragmentation in the construction industry has promoted competition among project
participants over shares of construction dollars and has blurred the individual responsibilities
' Changing Trends in Project Delivery: The Move to Design/Build
11 lth Annual Meeting, April 26-29, 1995 Fairmont Hotel San Francisco California
' The CII was established at the University of Texas to motivate a closer partnership among academic,
government, and private sector members of the industry.
9 Changing Trends in Project Delivery: The Move to Design/Build
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of its participants. By nature, this fragmented environment leaves little or no resources for
investment in research and development of materials and production methods, therefore
adding to the industry's resistance to technological change. The system of incentives and risk
allocation which was developed under the traditional method, encourages each participant to
maximize his or her own share of resources and fails to reward team integration for total
project performance.
1.3.4 An In efficient System
As project complexity and owner requirements change, any industry must adapt to
the forces which mold its environment. Our industry has failed to gradually adapt to these
forces and now is ripe for a drastic change. The construction industry, though more complex
than most other industries, must still adapt not only is product but also its services to
changes in what Michael E. Porter describes as the Elements of Industry Structure or more
commonly known as the five forces. As mentioned previously, most of the change
experienced by the industry today, comes from pressures exerted by outside organizations
and by more demanding owners.
The industry struggles in the development of a proactive approach to its problems.
As mentioned by Dr. Porter, though understanding the five forces better than your
competitors is the essence of any competitive strategy, a firm is not a prisoner of its
competitive strategy.
11th Annual Meeting, April 26-29, 1995 Fairmont Hotel San Francisco California
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Figure 1.1 Porter's Elements of Industry Structure
Five Forces
Threat of New I
Bargaining Pov
of Suppliers
Suppliers
Industry
wer Bargainin
Competitors of Buyers
Intensity
of Rivalry
Threat of Substitutes
Substitutes
Source: Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance
"Firms through their strategies can influence the five forces. If afirm can shape structure,
it can fundamentally change an industry's attractiveness for better or for worse." 10
In this lies the essence of change for our industry: A/E's, contractors, suppliers or anyone
else involved in the construction environment needs not look outside for others to give them
answers, but look at what the market demands, and develop ways to supply it.
The separation of services and fragmentation which our industry faces, inhibit the
industry's ability to respond to market conditions. For the construction industry, response
to risk and responsibility has been a double edged sword. While trying to make
0o Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Michael E. Porter 1985
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the system more clear and efficient, the industry has hampered its ability to react by
tightening what was once an organic and flexible form. Outdated allocation of project risk,
together with a large public misconception on the judgmental nature of A/E's practice, has
damaged the industry's structure and taken profitability to the levels were it is today.
Though few would argue against the idea that any project's success depends on the efficient
incorporation of all of the trades involved in its delivery, the industry still is reluctant to do
so. "New products which require reorientation of corporate goals or production facilities
tend to originate outside organizations devoted to a "specific" production system; or, if
originated within, to be rejected by them. ,"
New delivery systems, though aiming at solving the problem by providing a
"seamless" integration of services, are in most cases falling short of doing so. As companies
or industry sectors are more resistant to change, they often create barriers between
themselves and the market. The S-curve phenomenon explained by Richard N. Foster in his
book, Technology in the Modern Corporation: A Strategic Perspective 12, portrays what is
happening to the construction industry today. Products and systems, such as Design-Bid-
Build for example, have inherent limitations in their future applicability. While other sectors
are moving to new ground, the construction industry stubbornly holds on to products and
especially systems which are rapidly approaching their final slopes on their respective life
cycle curves. An unrealistic faith in outdated customer needs, has masked for many years a
" Patterns of Industrial Innovation, William J. Abernathy & James M. Utterback
12 Technology in the Modern Corporation: A Strategic Perspective, 1986
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mislead approach that is becoming more clear today with an even faster pace of technological
change.
Figure 1.2 The S-Curve Phenomenon
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1.3.5 Obscured Professionalism
The burden of legal considerations created by the more "sophisticated" system of
rules and regulations has not only induced a fragmentation of the industry, but has in many
ways damaged professionalism itself. In the industry of today, the burden of legal
considerations has reached the point where in many cases is poses a bigger worry than
business considerations themselves. As A/E's step away from responsibilities which were
hhh,
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once theirs, they are creating the seeds of their own end. By stepping away from
responsibilities, their role in the value system is decreasing continually.
The one way flow of information from the A/E to the contractor has disconnected
design from economic realities, created inefficiencies in management and inhibited
technological progress. The structure of the building industry, ( in which many smaller firms
operate in narrow geographic areas and lack vertical integration), together with a complex
regulatory framework with many locally administered building codes, concentrated attention
on reducing the initial cost of facilities (often at the expense of higher operating and
maintenance costs), and the exposure to litigation that increases business risks of new
products and processes; are all factors deterring the advancement of the industry. 13
Too often designers do not have direct experience with costs, products, or procedures
even despite their acquisition of such services from "special" consultants. Because of the
fragmentation created by the professional separation which exists today, the design process
often does not account for critical field based information until it is too late to be of use. As a
result of this inefficiency, the ultimate loss comes to the owner, who must face longer than
necessary project schedules, and increased project costs. As this happens, owners
increasingly attempt to shed both design and construction phase liability, the result of this
being a shift towards the provision of design services contracted directly to the builder.
" New Technology and Innovation In the U.S. Building-Related Industries, The Role of Public Agencies In
Fostering New Technology And Innovation In Building; Committee on New Technology and innovation in
Building, Washington 1992
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1.4 Contractual Risk Shifting -Greater Costs than Gains-
1.4.1 Architect Engineer Liability
" One who undertakes to render professional services is under a duty to the person
for whom the service is to be performed to exercise such care ,skill, and diligence as men in
that profession ordinarily exercise under like circumstances."'14
Under this applicable legal principle the court concluded that the A/E's failure to
determine the actual size of piping, as it was required by contract, was a breach of its duty to
the City and actionable in tort for negligence. This decision in City of Eveleth V. Ruble'5, was
based, like many other cases, on a very specific allegation of negligence. In this case the
designer was required to "analyze the piping, valving, and structural characteristics of the
existing plant" prior to the preparation of plans, specifications, costs estimates, and contract
documents. Even though the A/E went in and did as the documents specified, the designer
failed to recognize the actual size of existing intake piping, therefore designing a system
inadequate for handling required volume of water.
This case is one of the many cases discussed by John B. Miller in his paper,
Architect/Engineer Liability Through the Year 2000 (Is it Absolute?) .16 As one of my
professors, and as author of numerous articles in the areas of architect engineer liability,
construction claims, and dispute resolution in the construction industry, the ideas of Mr.
Miller have had a deep influence in my work. As he explains, the typical contractual
agreements between owner (or turnkey developer) and A/E have blurred the distinction
14 Eveleth, sura at 253, 225 N.W.2d at 254
15 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521 (1974)
16 Gadsby & Hannah Boston & Washington DC January 31, 1992
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between the duties assumed by contract and those imposed by the law of negligence. "Where
the A/E and its client dispute the quality of A/E's work, negligence and contract theories
nearly coincide, because nearly every claimed breach of contract duty by the A/E may also be
cast as negligence" 17
What is "ordinary" for our industry? How far can you take the "ordinary" in order to
establish that anyone in your position would have done the same ? Where is the line between
breach of contract and negligence? As I have mentioned before, most of us simply blame
lawyers for having obscured a system that was once "straightforward". Yet it is the purpose
of this document to prove otherwise.
The SLIM (discussed in chapter five), is a first cut at demonstrating that we, and not
lawyers, can take control over risk; and that doing so will not only be to the benefit of
designers, contractors and suppliers, but also to the benefit of all those involved directly or
indirectly in the construction industry. While the ideas presented in the model by no means
are perfect or final, I hope they will open the eyes of those seeking to explore new roads in
an industry, that though old and mature, will never stop evolving.
1.4.2 A Better Contract?: Static Risks and Diminishing Returns
One of the strongest arguments in favor of a complete reversal in the risk aversion
tendencies which the industry faces today, lies in the success of the contractual risk shifting
"7 Architect/Engineer Liability Trough the Year 2000 (Is it Absolute?) Gadsby & Hannah Boston &
Washington DC January 31, 1992
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practices of A/E's. Courts have proved that the bullet proof contract doesn't exist. As
designers contractually step away from liability, they are at the same time giving away
control over that liability. Negligence disputes between A/E' s and third parties continue to be
a heavy concern among professionals. Even in the absence of privity of contract between the
designer and the third-party, courts have in many cases imposed responsibility to the law of
negligence over designers.
An excellent example of this is seen in architects. The relationship between the
Architect and the Owner, different to that of the Architect and third parties, relies on a
contractual duty between the parties involved. Though at common law the lack of contractual
relationship with a third-party bars actions for both negligence and breach of contract, court
rulings have obscured these lines of responsibility18 . A perfect example of courts
obscurement of the law is given by Miller in the case of Shoffner Industries. Inc. v. W.B.
Lloyd Construction Company. In this case, a series of roof trusses collapsed during erection,
even after the A/E advised the General Contractor that the proper bracing of the trusses was
critical to the structural stability during construction.
The law imposes upon every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the
positive duty to use ordinary care as to protect others from harm. A violation of that duty is
negligence. It is immaterial whether the person acts in his own behalf or under contract with
another.
Shoffner, supra at 54
Like many other cases where courts have been tempted to apply a general standard of
care to A/E' s, irrespective of contract, the court in this case adopted Florida's rule as stated
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in A.R. Mover. Inc. v. Graham 19. In this rule, a General Contractor has an action against an
architect for negligence without privity of contract. In Shoffner Industries, Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd
Construction Company, the court went as far as to refer to the broad policies in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. 20, where consumers were given the right to sue manufacturers for injury
caused by defective products. Cases like this, which are not uncommon in our industry,
reinforce what I intend to prove and provide alternate solutions for.
Many designers today feel that the return on their investment is not moving at an
even pace with their share of risk and responsibilities. With design only adding between 10
and 15 percent of the total cost of a project, the share between risk and return is becoming
more and more unbalanced. Many A/E's constantly feel squeezed to provide a level of service
for which they don't have the financial resources needed to effectively do so. Yet, as
designers contractually step away from liability, they are themselves limiting their
participation, therefore limiting their return, and constantly giving away their place on the
value chain. No matter what designers do, their risks will always be there. Contractual
customization is not a way out, but a way in. Design/Build, Construction Management and
Turnkey are all great ideas, but are ideas that not only need a change in a contract, but a
change in the system. This is no dream and is simpler than anyone thinks, but we just have to
look at things from a different perspective. What can be changed is the degree of control
which one has over risk, not the amount of risks. Risks, like matter, can be transformed but
18 Forte Brothers. Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 525 A. 2d 1301 (R.I. 1987)
19 285 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1973)
20 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)
Chapter 1 Introduction
never destroyed. As mentioned before, SLIM is a first look at how this can be done; the same
cards, the same players, just a different way of playing the game.
1.4.3 Decreased Bonding and Increased Issue Percentages
Current practice gives little or no opportunity for designers to obtain competitive
levels of financial leverage. Due to the nature of the Design-Bid-Build process, designers are
rarely in the position to achieve contract volumes which might compare with that of the
average contractor. Thus, the nature of the system places the designer in a disadvantageous
bargaining position.
The unbalanced bargaining power of the different participants in the delivery of most capital
projects not only hurts those who are at a disadvantage in the process, but the industry as a
whole. The environment of litigation nurtured by this type of system creates a win lose
situation.
The use of contractual risk shifting strategies, which has nurtured the adversarial relationship
that exists today, has negatively influenced the cost efficiency of the industry. Always having
someone on the loosing side has only caused increased mark-ups, decreased bonding
capacities, and escalating insurance costs.
1.4.4 Increased Time & Costs
The misallocation of contractual risk is considered in my work as one of the mayor
inefficiencies of the system. It is common knowledge that in construction, time is money,
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therefore it is here were mayor improvements can be made. The inefficiencies created by the
inherently adversarial relationship which exists today, not only cost money to builders,
designers and owners, but inflate costs all the way down the value system.
The birth of design/build, and its newly gained acceptance, not only by the private
sector but also by various public agencies, is the beginning of a new era for construction. Still,
the success or failure of new delivery systems like design/build or Construction Management
is heavily reliant on better and more efficient allocations of risk. The benefits created by
having the increased communication and overlapping of design and construction services
which design/build provides, can be easily undermined by ill-judged allocations of
responsibilities. In design/build, for a project to be successful, the design/builder must work
as a single unit, taking evenly all the responsibility together with all of the risk.
As many firms have found out, this can be tricky. Partnering, incentive contracting
and strategic alliances now come to the forefront. In an industry thirsty for improvement,
these methods have offered participants with a way of finding a previously blurry common
ground. In different ways, they all have provided incentives for long-term commitment,
shared vision, trust, and an understanding of each other's goals. While none of these goals are
"easily" reached, they are indeed the keys to new and better ways of overcoming roadblocks
which have slowed the industry in its search for: improved efficiency, higher cost
effectiveness, faster technological advancement, better service and improved quality.
While an effective team building process can bring significant, not just marginal
improvements, it must yet be understood this is not just a matter of gathering good people
and working together. As long as friction for potential unbalanced risks exists between the
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parties involved, none of this will ever work. The incorporation of a diverse group of
individuals willing to resolve differences, remove roadblocks, and proactively build and
develop a group into an aligned, focused and motivated team striving for a common mission of
shared goals, objectives and priorities, cannot be self-sustaining if an organizational, legal and
financial framework is not developed to support the entity under a balanced sharing of risk,
return and responsibilities.
1.5 Closed Boxes -From Professional Education to Practice-
Closed boxes is what the industry nurtured for many years. Since the separation of
Architects and Engineers after Napoleon's division of L'Ecole Politecnique in France, the
professions which once worked as one in the delivery of any project, now were pushed to
grow apart. This tendency is still prevalent, and is encouraged in many ways by the current
educational system.
Architecture and Engineering programs have different students, different buildings,
different classes, different ideas, different methods and yet are supposed to graduate
professionals willing to work as a team for a single goal. The friction that exists today is not
caused by lawyers, architects or engineers, but by a system that breeds a nurtured separation
between individuals which have "no choice" but to work together. The ideas presented in my
work are intended to open up new alternatives. By providing a framework for a system that
will efficiently support and encourage the joint participation of all those involved in project
delivery, there is an opportunity to reverse engineer a system that must change.
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In order to effectively reach the previously mentioned goals, team participation and
goal sharing are not only goals to strive for in the field, but also in professional programs.
Architects, owners and engineers all have essential pieces of the puzzle, and without any of
them the puzzle is not complete.
This section entails all that guides me to find better ways. My studies as an
architect/engineer gave me a first glance at the division. "Architecture" by architects,
"Engineering" by engineers, buildings by who? The failure, or opposition by professional
schools to "surrender" their status, is not only failing its students, but failing the industry.
Still, the construction industry-archaic, adversarial, with a poor public image and a history of
projects gone bad-continues on alive and well, and most importantly changing. Good or bad
as it may be, our industry is still society's measure of quality of life, and is up to us to
change it for the better, and provide our market with nothing less than our best.
II. An Industry View of Project Delivery
2.1 A Critical Look at the Procurement System
2.1.1 The Declining Role of the Architect
Where once the architect was capable of providing a whole range of services to the
owner as his complete representative during both the design and construction stages, the
architects of today face great threats to this once established framework. The planning service
provided by architects during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries included most of what
is provided by sub-consultants today. An increased project complexity, together with
outdated approaches to design and construction, has taken a huge toll on the once key
position of the architect in the value system. Were once the architect was key in the initial
planning stages of a project, this no longer necessarily the case.
Architects have found themselves overwhelmed with rapidly changing technologies
and project types. The proliferation of project delivery methods has eroded the boundaries of
traditional practice21. Management consultants are expanding strategy-based services into the
traditional realm of architects, construction managers are developing consulting services based
on technical knowledge traditionally reserved for support of construction services, and
developers are offering broad skill sets to provide planning services similar to those
traditionally given by architects (See Figure 2.1).
Yet, looked at from a different perspective, the proliferation of project delivery
methods has only been a way of filling gaps left in the industry. One could say that new
21 RECORD, March 1995, pages 28-33
Risk Management in Capital Project Delivery:
A Value Study of Changing Trends in Contractual Risk Allocation
methods of project delivery are not eroding the boundaries of traditional practice, but taking
the slack left by A/E's.
Shifting demands in the services required of planners indicates that traditional
architects are less likely to have the required capabilities to provide these services. At the
AIA's summit on Expanding Architectural Services, held in September 1995 in Nashville
Tennessee, speakers defined different market forces challenging the current role of the
architect as the synthesizer and problem-solver.
Figure 2.1 Erosion of Planing Services
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These included22:
* The encroachment of related professions such as interior design , landscape architecture,
and program management.
* The increasing number of architects choosing "alternative" careers in fields such as
facilities management, construction management, and community advocacy.
* The chipping away of architects' traditional turf, not just by allied professionals, but also
by consultants lacking architectural training and licensing, such as real-estate
professionals, accountants, and management consultants.
The challenges presented today lie not in the capacities of the specialist, but in the
liaison characteristics which once were the strength of architects. The construction industry is
a living organism of checks and balances that evolves continually, but yet requires direction.
The gap in coordination created by risk aversion tendencies has created inefficiencies for
which owners are no longer willing to pay. Architects have to step up to new services if they
intend to stay in the game.
2.1.1.1 Redesigning the Architect
What services? AIA's Richard Hobbs and California Council's George Chong give a
very good example of the possibilities23. Yet, the industry induced changes which architects
are facing today will require more than a change in the spectrum of services provided by the
architect. They will require a redefinition of their roles within the value system. As architects
step back from the traditional roles, they are widening a gap in the system that has greatly
22 Architectural Record, February 1996
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diminished their value position. If architect's intend to regain a main role in the system of
value activities for project delivery, they must get back into the game.
Figure 2.2 Expanded Spectrum of Services
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Architects, more than just expanding their services, need to regain the characteristics
that once made them valuable in the delivery process. As the traditional owner representative,
the architect was both a catalyst and a facilitator for the process. To regain stature and the
full confidence from clients, architects must overcome a general lack of understanding of
business strategy. Architects have no choice but to acquire and efficiently implement the
management and communication skills they have failed to incorporate in their education.
Changes in industry composition should not be something to fear, but blocks to build on. As
"3 Architectural Record, February 1996
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shown in figure 2.3, if architects don't step up to the bat and try to become the facilitators
the industry no longer has, somebody else will.
Figure 2.3 The Facilitator Gap
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2.1.2 Win- Loose Relationships: A barrier that Information Technology
won't overcome
Yet for architects, or anyone else stepping up to become a facilitator in the process,
the quick answer would be: " We first have to improve communication!". No, we don't have
to first improve communication!. Improving communication is worthless if people don't have
a common interest in sharing information. Lotus Notes, the Inter-Net, video conferencing, are
all useless if we don't first fix the way we do business. The Win-lose environment in which
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the construction industry has matured even to this day works completely against the
fundamental ideas behind any will to share anything. Design/Build, Construction
Management and Partnering, all great approaches to the problem that are discussed in later
chapters, have found ways to make common goals profitable for all. Still, there is much to
learn from these approaches, and in my opinion, a lot to be improved with a careful
rethinking of how we do things. Team work is worthless if the team doesn't win or lose
together. No matter how many architects, engineers and consultants you have on a project,
there is only one project. This is in the core of what SLIM is pushing to achieve. As will
become evident in chapter five, if you take apart what the model provides, you have nothing
more than what we have today. Yet, if you put the pieces together working for a common
purpose of success, or failure, the strength gained from synergy can be more than anyone can
imagine.
2.1.3 Risk Aversion.- The effects on Innovation
Risk aversion tendencies have been extremely detrimental to rates of innovation
within the construction industry. New construction in the United States (which includes
major alterations and renovations of existing facilities) is a more than a $500 billion per year
industry that employs some 6.7 million people. Construction alone accounts for
approximately 7 to 9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). However, if government
action to foster innovation in the building industries could increase overall productivity by as
little as 1 percent, the likely payoff nationwide could be more than $5 billion dollars
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annually 24. A study by the office of Technology Assessment characterized U.S. engineering
and construction firms as" content to adopt construction technologies pioneered elsewhere,"
but blamed the design-bid-build, or traditional delivery method, for weakening incentives to
adopt new technologies 25
Observers, like Dr. J.K Yates of the University of Colorado 26,have expressed concern
that the declining position of U.S. construction firms in global markets is due, at least in part
to declining commitment to R&D in building-related industries. Being about 0.4 percent of
annual construction output, the aggregate spending by industry and government on research
and development in these industries is definitely well below levels that the industries'
aggregate size and importance warrant27 . Comparing the construction industry to other
mature industries such as appliances (at 1.4%), or textiles at(0.8%). the amount of R&D
allocated to the industry is still low28. A 1990 evaluation of Japan's construction industry,
which was sponsored by the National Science Foundation, found that the aggressive and
productive research by both industry and government, have put the nation at the forefront of
construction technology.29 With so much talk about design/build and partnering, it is even
more interesting to hear that a subsequent study of major Japanese R&D facilities sponsored
by the Civil Engineering Research Foundation (1991), attributed much of Japan's apparently
4 D.R. Dibner and A.C. Lemer. "New Technology and Innovation in the U.S. Building-Related Industries", in
The Role of Public Agencies in Fostering New Technology and Innovation in Building, National Academy
Press, Washington, DC, 1992.
25 Office of Technology Assessment, 1987
26 J.K. Yates. "International Competitiveness of U.S. Construction Firms," Project Management Journal 22(1)
(1991)
27 D.R. Dibner and A.C. Lemer. "New Technology and Innovation in the U.S. Building-Related Industries",
8 D.R. Dibner and A.C. Lemer. 1992
29 Tucker et al., 1991
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substantial ability to move from the "lab" to the field, to very close ties between researchers
and construction professionals.
There are many reasons why the U.S. is falling behind in global construction markets.
However as this thesis reinforces, many of the problems faced by the industry are caused by
outdated approaches to construction that deprive the construction industry of the liberty and
flexibility it needs to change. The structure of building industries, (in which many smaller
firms operate in narrow geographic areas and lack vertical integration), a complex regulatory
framework with many locally administered building codes, concentrated attention on
reducing initial costs (often at the expense of higher operation and maintenance costs), and
exposure to litigation that increases the business risks of new products and processes- are all
among the factors that have deterred the spread of new ideas.
Traditional procurement methods are probably one of the biggest producers of
barriers to innovation. First, award of contracts on low bid basis, for example, increases the
bidder's risk in trying new things because he must bear both (costs and responsibility) while
the owner may obtain the benefits over the longer term. Secondly, rigid budgeting and
construction contracting practices that focus on low price often preclude higher spending to
build a facility that will cost less to maintain or will yield more reliable service in the future.
Designers, owners, and managers are understandably reluctant to try new technology that
may lead to expensive litigation if an accident occurs of if the new technology fails to perform
adequately. Though pre-selection of bidders, design/build, and other mechanisms can be used
to encourage cooperation among participants in order to ease the introduction of new ideas, as
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long as there is not a framework which makes cooperation profitable for all, the industry will
never move any faster than it is moving today.
2.2 The Traditional Method
2.2.1 Relationship of Parties
In the most traditional construction project, the typical parties include the owner, the
owner's lender, an architect, a contractor, a contractor's subcontractors, everybody's
insurance companies, and, perhaps a surety (See Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4 The Traditional Organization
The owner is the person or entity commissioning and pursuing the project, and the owner's
lender is the person or entity providing the financing for the project. The architect or other
designer is the person or entity hired by the owner to design the project and to watch over
construction of the project to "assure"( to a certain degree) it is built according to the final
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design. The contractor is the entity or person hired by the owner to construct the project, and
his most basic obligations to the owner are to do the project for an agreed price, within a
specified time, and according to certain standards of quality. The general contractor retains
the subcontractors to assist in the construction of the project by providing labor and/or
materials for the project. The insurance company, which is involved with parties on an
individual basis, can provide coverage to one or all for damages to persons or property
depending on the particular need of the different parties. Finally, if a surety is involved, the
surety provides a bond or other form of assurance giving the owner someone to fall back on in
the event of default by the contractor.
2.2.2 The Limitations of Contractual Risk Shifting
Ideally, allocation of risk should be based upon the ability to control risk. The party
who has the greatest ability to control a risk factor should assume responsibility for that risk.
Conversely, the party with the least amount of control should not be expected to assume the
loss for matters over which that party has no control. However, few construction contracts
are negotiated this way. Instead, in today's market all too often the intent is to shift risk to
somebody else in the contract chain without regard to who controls the risk. Without concern
for ability to control risk, each participant wants to protect itself by shifting the risk to the
next person in the contract chain. The willingness to accept risk increases in direct proportion
to the amount of reward. If the potential of reward is great, those involved will be willing to
accept more risk.
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2.2.3 Where has the System Failed?
Under the traditional system, the share of risks and rewards has been unbalanced.
With decreasing rewards, there have been increasing attempts to use contract language as
means of shifting risks. When risks cannot be eliminated for everyone, the natural reaction is
to attempt to have everybody else bear the risk. Contract language tries to meet this goal, but
has constantly failed. Risk shifting has only blurred control of responsibilities, therefore
creating a greater exposure to risk.
Figure 2.5 Exposure to risk in the Traditional Method
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Figure 2.5 gives a graphic representation of how the typical project participant
(owner, A/E, or builder), is positioning himself today on the delivery of any capital project
under the traditional method. As project complexity varies, the degree of exposure of project
participants in the traditional system adjusts proportionally. Contractual risk shifting only
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serves to hide risks temporarily, placing them in someone else's hands. By giving away
responsibility, participants are not only increasing their exposure relative to project
complexity, but also in terms of their ability to control risk. By shifting risks, the participant
gives away control, while at the same time weakening his negotiating position with a directly
proportional share in the decision process and monetary reimbursement for the risk.
Interestingly enough, when the initial desire was to reduce exposure to risk, more often than
not, participants today are equally or more exposed than they would have been if a more
careful allocation of risks and returns had been conducted.
If contractual risk shifting tries to impose risks to those who are least able to control
it, exposure will not only increase to the one with the least amount of control, but to all
involved in the delivery process. Still, the truth is that the risk is always there, in many cases
hidden to those who can control it and visible to those who probably don't have the ability to
do anything about it. Contracts are not bulletproof, and their increased level of detail indicates
that there is something wrong. The solution to the problem will not come with better
contracts, but instead with the development of a better foundation from which those
contracts can be built.
2.2.4 Increased Complexity and Decreased Participation
While technology and project complexity continue to increase, the framework
established by the traditional method is working against the ability of participants to adapt
and respond to new challenges. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the adversarial
environment affects, innovation, profitability and productivity. At the same time, everybody
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has joined a game of risk shifting strategy. Still, there is one factor that has a profound effect
on the structuring of the industry which hasn't been mentioned yet; insurance. Insurance
serves as perfect proof for what was presented in table 2.5. As projects become more
complex, and the degree of participation in the risk sharing scheme becomes more blurred,
insurance has become a steadily increasing financial weight on project delivery. By stepping
away from risk, the construction industry has increased overall exposure. The increased
overall exposure created by miss-allocated risks has translated to higher insurance fees,
increased deductibles and inflated delivery costs.
2.3 The Traditional Coverage
2.3.1 Designer: Professional Liability Insurance
Although A/E's have turned to contractual customization for liability shelter, they
have instead found decreasing returns and increasing litigation. Contract clauses, such as
limitation of liability, no-forfeiture, or foreshortened statute of limitations, may not protect
designers as intended. These contract clauses, at best, will only be effective between the
designer and the client, but cannot bind third parties. These clauses may not be effective at all
if there is an anti-indemnity statute or if a limitation of liability or foreshortened statute of
limitations has been determined to be against public policy, and therefore unenforceable.
Another method that is not as effective as A/E's anticipated is the professional
corporation. In almost every state, there is a distinction between professional corporation and
business cooperation. The statutes specifically provide that as to professional negligence,
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there is personal liability similar to a partnership, so that the corporate structure is not a total
shield to liability30 . Some exceptions do exist. For instance, if there is a large judgment against
the professional corporation, it can wipe out all of the corporate assets except for the pension
fund, because there is a provision by the Federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act,
which permits such pension funds to be immune from attachment for the satisfaction of a
judgment against the professional corporation.
Professional liability coverage, be it in the form of a "claims made" or "occurrence
policy" is to many A/E's a gamble with no clear return. Why get insurance? Is it worth it? To
many designers it is not a question of whether they want insurance, but more a question of
whether they can afford it. The defense of a professional liability-suit, if it goes to trial, can
be in the range of $50,000-$500,000. Most of these claims and suits are settled or dismissed,
and the statistics from insurance companies indicate that the greatest expenditure is toward
the legal defense, not for the claims themselves. Many recommend not to buy insurance at all,
but instead develop funds for covering litigation fees that might arise. In report presented by
the Journal ofManagement in Engineering, some general guidelines are given for this type of
fund. A designer may want to have a fund in the vicinity of $150,000. A firm of 6 to 20
professionals may need a fund in the range of $300,000. For a larger firm, though it is
mentioned that having no professional liability coverage is inadvisable, a minimum of
$1,000,000 would be more than justified. Still, the potential exposure to a catastrophic loss is
definitely be overwhelming. Is there a better way?
30 Liability Insurance for Design Professionals, Journal of Management in Engineeringl March/April 1994
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2.3.2 Builder: Builder's Risk, General Liability, Worker's Compensation
Suits for damages to property, contracted entities, workers or third parties are the
everyday life of General Contractors. Different to A/E's, contractors have much larger cash
flows and thus are able to cover the costs of insurance with much less suffering. Still, this is
not without any suffering at all. Costs of insurance for general contractors range between 7
and 15 percent of their total contract volume. The typical insurance coverage for a contractor
includes Builder's Risk, General Liability and Worker's Compensation.
Builder's Risk covers damage to physical structures. Covered property, as used in
the Coverage part for the Builder's Risk Coverage Form by Commercial Risk Services Inc.31
includes: foundations, property in or within 100 feet of premises (fixtures, machinery,
equipment, building materials and supplies, and temporary structures built or assembled on
site). Additional coverage can be provided for debris removal, preservation of property, fire
department service charges, pollutant clean up and removal and building materials and
supplies of others. Builder's Risk does not cover land (including land on which the property
is located) or water, signs (other than sign attached to the building) and the following
property when outside of buildings: lawns, trees, shrubs or plants, and radio or television
antennas. Covered property does not include the value of buildings or structures existing
prior to construction of the improvements, alterations or repairs.
General Liability, on the other hand, will pay for "those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which the
31 Builder's Risk Form, ISO Commercial Risk Services, Inc., 1983, 1987
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insurance applies." The insurance policy applies to "bodily injury" and property damage
only if:
(1) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that takes place
in the "coverage territory"; and
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during the policy period
Damages because of "bodily injury" include damages claimed by any person or organization
for care, loss of services or death resulting from "bodily injury". The insurance does not
apply to: expected or intended injuries, liquor liability, workers compensation, employers
liability, pollution, mobile equipment, war, damage to property, damage to the product,
damage to the work, damage to impaired property, property not physically injured or recall
of products, work or impaired property.
Finally Workers Compensation covers for "bodily injury" caused to any contracted
worker at the site. In various countries, such as in the case of Puerto Rico, Worker's
Compensation insurance is not provided by private insurance companies, but instead by the
Government of Puerto Rico.
2.3.3 Owner :Wrap-Up insurance
Owners, or contractors, on the other hand have the option of buying what is called
Wrap Up or "All Risks" insurance. Although expensive, this has proved to be a wise way to
eliminate added overhead costs of sub-contractor insurance reimbursements and other
associated costs of individual insurance packaging. In some cases, Wrap Up Insurance can be
prohibitively costly with premiums costing almost as much as the amount of coverage
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provided32 . Yet, in cases like this, cost is increased because of the bundling of Errors &
Omissions insurance with the rest of the coverage. The normal coverage for this type of
insurance includes 33:
a) Property in the course of construction, reconstruction or repair whilst at the
risk of the Assured and whilst at the location of the said construction,
reconstruction or repair operations which are subject of the contract or
contracts described in the Schedule attached to the policy.
b) Property of every kind and description (including materials an supplies)
used or to be used in or part of the construction operations wherever the said
property may be located within the Continental United States of America,
Employees tools and personal property.
Still, as said before, though sometimes tremendously costly, all coverages can be
bundled together in one policy. This becomes an extremely challenging problem. How to
provide single coverage, but yet make it attractive enough so that it can be feasible?
32 Information provided in interview with Maureen McDonough from the Massachusetts Ports Authority
33 ", All Risk" Form, ISQ Commercial Risk Services, Inc., 1983, 1987
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2.4 Increasing costs of Coverage
2.4.1 The Insurance Industry's Position
The insurance industry, like all of the participants involved in project delivery, faces a
time of change. As competition becomes stronger, and as customers develop better
perspectives of what they want from them, insurance companies are faced with the pressure
to take a second look at their services. As acknowledged by a report in Engineering News
Record34 ,
" Many now realize that risk management cannot be delegated with a premium
payment. This passive approach simply increases costs and results in a non-competitive
posture".
Insurance companies are there to make money, and this can't be forgotten. The construction
industry must look for better ways to handle risk, instead of expecting passively for
insurance companies to cover their backs. This type of attitude is exactly what has taken
insurance costs to were they are today. As stated by Danny B. Parrish, "Contractors need to
get past the idea that it is the insurance company's problem. This is really our money.""' 35 You
can't state the issue any clearer than this. Although some industry groups have dealt better
with the situation, the industry in general still has far to go. The report in ENR tries to make
it sound as if the insurance industry is the one that is suffering, it is worth noting that for
1995, the industry expected to realize a net profit of 26 billion dollars after-tax (See Figure
2.6).
4 ENR Special Advertising Section: Insurance, August 28,1995
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On the other hand, insurance companies know there is a lot of competition and that they will
have to do everything possible to get as much as they can from the available premium pool.
As explained by Tim Gow3 6;
"Insurance companies are being buffeted by two separate distinct pressures. One is the excess
capacity resultingfrom favorable results and recent investments. Simultaneously, self-
insurance and the other risk retention alternatives are lurking. This forces insurance carriers
to decrease their prices or to improve their coverage (or both) to retain their clients or attract
new ones."
Figure 2.6 U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Industry Results
U.S. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY RESULTS
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Still, the litigation environment makes change risky. As long as the construction industry
relinquishes it control over risk, the insurance industry will be a significant unmanaged
influence on project delivery costs.
HI. The VRAM (Venture Risk Analysis Model)
3.1 Model Methodology
The Venture Risk Analysis Model is used as a graphic tool to better understand
the implications of risk aversion in capital project delivery. Participant risk positioning
during project delivery is examined by mapping the way a person (or an entity) places
himself (relative to risk) in the delivery of any project. In order to do this, the model
measures three primary conditions: (1) Project Complexity,(2) Factor of Strength in
Negotiation, and (3) Degree of Exposure.
The risks selected for the measurement of each of the three conditions, derive from
two earlier studies which were examined as part of the literature read previous to the
development of the model. Using Primary Consultant Options for Capital Project
Planning: A Market Analysis and Selection Methodology 7 , and Contrasting Design-Bid-
Build with Design Build38 as building blocks, two sets of risk variables were developed.
The first of these set of variables is used in the modeling of Project Complexity and the
second, in the calculation of Degree of Exposure and Factor of Strength in Negotiation.
In order to perform a numerical approximation of an individual's positioning in the
delivery of a capital project, a scale of 1 to 4, with four being the best possible alternative
(in terms of its exposure implications), is used for each of the risks. Each risk is then
measured in relation to a set of factors of influence. For each condition, each of the risks is
measured against two factors. After giving a value to each of the risks, an average is
7 Thomas K. Davies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1994
38 Jeffrey L. Beard, Design-Build Dateline, Design Build Institute of America, July-August 1995
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calculated from the two and then a single average is determined for all of risks in each of
the conditions.
3.1.1 Project Complexity
In order to accurately measure project complexity, one must examine a multitude
of specific issues, each of which has a direct influence on the overall complexity of any
given project. As shown in Figure 3.1, a qualitative measurement of project complexity is
performed by aggregating project and delivery complexity as physical, temporal, financial,
and external. Using a scale of 1 to 4, with four indicating the highest possible effect on
overall exposure which a single factor may imply, specific values are assigned to different
subcategories.
Figure 3.1 Project Complexity
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3.1.1.1 Physical
Physical complexities are the least abstract, and easily measured of all four
primary categories used in the mapping. For the purpose of the research, physical
complexity is measured as an aggregate of four sub-categories :
(1) Scale Challenge : While fairly straight forward in its implications, it is also a
factor of project modularity. While a project may be extremely large, its
complexity could be greatly reduced by the degree to which it is integrated into
or is the prototype for a larger facility.
(2) Technology : As probably one of the fastest changing factors of physical
complexity today, technological complexity is highly correlated with project
types .Technological sophistication of a project can be affected by the use or
lack of prototypical elements, the tolerances of systems specifications, the
integration of physical systems, and the effect of aesthetics on the complexity
of physical systems.
(3) Site Complexity : Site issues, like hidden subsurface or site conditions,
represent significant risks which may affect a project at all levels. Because of
this, site complexity becomes an important factor in the measurement of
physical complexity. Apart from the already mentioned possibility of
subsurface conditions, weather, topography, and the completeness of site
information, can all add to the complexity of a project.
(4) Complexity ofProgram : Depending on the intended use of a facility,
programmatic sophistication may become an important source of complexity.
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As a result of this, a design can be made more complex by a diversity of inter-
relationships between design elements, longer required life spans of structures
built, and the need for programmatic flexibility.
3.1.1.2 Temporal
Adequacy of time and discontinuity in delivery are two main indicators of
temporal complexities. Inadequate or segmented amounts of time allocated to various
project phases (relative to industry standard practices), may have serious effects on
the delivery of a project. While a project may begin with an adequate schedule, a
project's complexity can be greatly increased by inflexible milestones and
discontinuities influenced by high levels of rework throughout the duration of the
project.
3.1.1.3 Financial
Depending on the financing vehicles and payment methods chosen for a project,
financial complexity may become a highly influential consideration. Cost plus or unit
priced projects for example, may present a higher flexibility, and thus lower levels of
financial complexity for the contractor, but higher levels of contract supervision to
the owner. Lump sum contracts on the other hand, more concerned with budget
adequacy, can require the inverse. While an owner may enjoy lower levels of financial
complexity through a fixed price, the contractor is often pressured with a much larger
level of financial strain due to the budget limitations which competitive bidding tends
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to induce. Underpriced projects can bring large amounts of friction, and end up
costing more through change orders than if started out under an adequate budget.
3.1.1.4 External
Under increasing market globalization, external complexity considerations become
more important than ever. Depending on where a project is to be built, environmental
considerations may be key to the success of a project. Regulatory, economic, and
socio-political factors comprise the relation of a project to its environment. Exchange
rates, governments and their regulations, labor requirements and professional practice
guidelines, market conditions, and political stability and support, all play key roles
in the delivery of capital projects.
After an analysis is made for all of these factors, the effect of each of these sub-categories
on Project Complexity is then calculated as an average of the relationship between their
individual levels of complexity, and how critical each of them is to the project being
examined. For example, socio-political considerations in a project done in the United
States (by a U.S. firm) would play a much less critical role, than if the project was done in
Iraq. To consolidate all of the calculations, the values are then assigned to each of the four
sub-categories and again averaged to reach a final calibration of Project Complexity.
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3.1.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
A party's factor of strength in negotiation is one of the most difficult areas to
map in order to determine overall exposure. Given a defined set of risks, two main factors
will influence a party's strength in negotiation: participation, and professional expertise.
For the purpose of the model, participation is defined as a party's ability to directly
influence any decision made towards the resolution of a problem. A total of 23 areas of
potential conflict (or risks) were selected for this. For each of these, a qualitative estimate
Figure 3.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
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of participation is made based on a scale of none to high (or 1 to 4), with the highest value
given to best condition, and then averaged against that given to the level of professional
expertise. Based on four secondary variables, the best condition is then defined as the one
which can provide the highest level in strength of negotiation to the party -or entity-
under analysis (high participation = 4). Based on this, an individual's level of
participation is seen as the resultant of the following four forces:
3.1.2.1 Contractual
Depending on the organization chosen, an individual (or party) will be positioned
to have a more or less active participation with respect to certain risks. For example
a contractor under design/build would have more participation during design, than if a
design-bid-build delivery was chosen.
3.1.2.2 Financial
Financial participation in the delivery of a capital facility is probably the best
source of leverage for increasing a party's strength of negotiation. The best example
here is the owner. Even if he has no professional expertise, and decided to shift a
large portion of the risk to other parties, the owner would still possess a high level of
strength in negotiation given his financial stake in the project.
3.1.2.3 Professional
Professional leverage is also important. Because of the risks involved in the
delivery of capital projects, and the often limited expertise of the owner, participants
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will thus benefit from a higher capacity to make decisions. A good example of this
could be the structural engineer. Even though he has little financial or contractual
power to change the design, he has a great amount of influence on extremely
important decisions made during a project.
3.1.2.4 Individual
Finally, all of the previous factors are also derivatives of each party's individual
ability to negotiate. Even if an entity is perfectly positioned to influence decisions
made, the negotiation process will still be conducted by individuals. If one of those
individual does not have the required negotiation skills to positively influence the
process, the other factors could potentially be weakened.
After this, professional expertise is measured. For this, each of the 23 risks is
mapped against specific levels of professional expertise. Professional expertise is
here defined as an individual's ( or entity's) level of professional training to
appropriately manage any conflicts arising as a result of a given risk. Similar to the
measurement of participation, professional expertise is measured on a scale ranging
from none to high (1 to 4), with 4 being the highest level of professional expertise.
3.1.4 Degree of Exposure
Individual exposure to specific risks must not be confused with overall degree of
exposure. For any project, overall exposure will vary proportionally to project
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complexity and strength of negotiation. On the other hand, an individual's degree of
exposure will only depend on the level of responsibility assumed over a given risk.
As in strength of negotiation, degree of exposure is measured using 23 basic risks
which are mapped against two influencing factors: Degree of control and Criticality. For
each of the 23 recognized risks, degree of control is given values from none to high (1 to 4)
depending on an individual's ability to control the risk. Since a person with a higher
Figure 3.3 Degree of Exposure
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degree of control would obviously be less exposed, the lowest number is given to it ( high
S1). Inversely, a person with the least amount of control would be under the greatest
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exposure (none = 4). Using this, values are given to all of the risks and then averaged
against the second factor, criticality.
Typically the various aspects identified are interrelated; thus the definitions and
indicated implications overlap. Criticality, similar to project complexity, is defined as the
level of potential influence a risk may have on the overall success of the project.
Depending on the potential losses which a problem in any given area may carry, the
criticality of that specific risk will then vary proportionally. As a function on the delivery
method chosen, a party's level of exposure can be associated with one or more of the
following areas.
3.1.4.1 Design
Under newer delivery methods like design/build and construction management,
design risk is being shared more and more by other parties. Construction managers
and design/builders are directly and indirectly becoming more and more responsible
over design. While the exposure of the design/builder is explicit in the contract, the
construction manager assumes under some circumstances, implicit responsibility
over certain issues.
3.1.4.2 Construction
While an owner may wish to participate in construction risk through various
means ( like the selection of cost-plus or unit price contracts) this is most commonly
not the case. Through the use of lump sum contracts, owners can transfer all of the
construction risk to the contractor. Yet, acknowledging that is not necessarily the
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best scenario, new variations in delivery methods try to find a better allocations of
risk. When this is the case, one or more of the participants in a project may be
accepting non traditional risks, thus proportionally affecting his level of exposure.
3.1.4.3 Financing
Last, but not least, there is the risk of financing. Similar to design and construction
risks, project financing risks have experienced certain deviations from traditional
allocation strategies. Turnkey and BOT projects are examples of this. Under these
two methods, contractors may acquire risks which were traditionally held by the
owner.
Depending on the organization chosen, certain risks may be more or less critical to
a project participant. While under a lump sum contract a builder could afford to have
little or no concern over time, the selection of a turnkey methodology would highly
"encourage" him to worry about time, thus making that risk much more critical than
it was before.
3.2 A Tool to the Owner
The Venture Risk Analysis Model, other than for the purpose of this research,
may also be a useful for anyone interested in having a general perspective of what
committing to a certain contract may imply. While VRAM was not designed for people
with limited knowledge of construction, anyone with a fair understanding of the delivery
process may find it very useful in representing a sometimes overwhelming amount of
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considerations. More than a source to find solutions, the Venture Risk Analysis Model
can serve as a source to ask the right questions.
In a time where projects are becoming increasingly more complex, and project
delivery is constantly changing to adapt to stricter requirements, owners are finding it
harder to keep up. Tools like the Venture Risk Analysis Model, must be developed to
aid project leaders in proactively allocating risks prior to any commitment to a specific
delivery method.
IV. Innovative Contract Strategies for Project Delivery:
The Search for a Better Way
4.1 Contracting Strategies for Design Services
In order for new delivery methods to be increasingly accepted by owners and the
industry in general, they must provide the opportunity for players to position themselves
better than in traditional delivery methods.
The first two chapters of this thesis provided a historical framework meant to pull
together some of the major difficulties which the industry faces today. Though many of the
ideas presented in the previous chapters might seem to cover mostly known facts for
practitioners today, a clarification and reinforcement of the environmental conditions involved
is an essential part in building the foundation needed for the analysis to follow.
4.1.1 Negligence Disputes
For project delivery to be improved, it is first necessary to provide a framework
which minimizes friction between parties. Those who promote different "new" delivery
systems, strongly believe that they provide better alternatives to traditional project delivery
methods. Although I do not question the potential of the "new" options, I do question how
these ideas translate into better alternatives given the static legal environment in which they
exist. For a new delivery method to be faster, or cheaper, or of higher product quality, it must
first be more efficient (both in terms of time and money) in the delivery of the facility.
The history of the Traditional Method (or Design-Bid-Build project delivery), which
was presented in chapters 1 & 2, provides an excellent preamble to what will be discussed
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further on. With the aid of a comparative value model (VRAM), chapter 4 takes a look at
how the potential benefits of many of the "new" delivery methods are obscured by the static
allocation of risk. Using VRAM as an analysis tool, this chapter takes a closer look at how
the different "new" methods of project delivery have (or have not) efficiently served the
construction industry by diminishing the amount of litigation in project delivery. Still, in
order to have a basis of comparison for determining whether or not the "new' methods
provide a better alternative to traditional organizations, it must first be established how the
different parties compare in terms of their risk position, if the choice of "traditional" project
delivery is used.
4.2 Participants' Risk Position under the "Traditional Method"
While risk in project delivery cannot be eliminated, it definitely can be managed both,
to the advantage and disadvantage of the process. While owners commonly are not the most
knowledgeable in terms of means and methods of construction, it is interesting to see that
relative to other parties involved in project delivery, they carry a major portion of the risk.
Even though the degree of exposure which different factors may imply varies with relation to
the person managing the risk, the conscious acceptance of risk is essential to any successful
project .
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4.2.1 The Owner
Based on a list of 23 common risks involved in project delivery, the traditional
method places the most exposure on the shoulders of the owner (See Figure 4.11). Figure 4.1
charts the "typical" owner's position in the traditional project delivery by looking at the level
of control and exposure that these risks may represent. Depending on the owner's level of
control over a given risk, his exposure to any problem related to that risk. The degree of
exposure faced by an owner is relative to the financial liability implications of failing to
adequately manage a given risk.
Figure 4.1 Owner's Contractually Accepted Risks under the Traditional Method
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While owner control will vary on an individual basis, the structure of traditional
project delivery promotes the creation of "points of friction" (See drivers in figure 4.1). The
former map presents the "average" condition of an owner under traditional project delivery.
However all of the shown drivers would be pre-determined in all Design-Bid-Build projects
by a delivery system which statically distributes them among the participants involved.
Given their limited control, owners are faced with inflated levels of legal and financial
exposure.
Looking at figure 4.1, owners share a very large portion of risks which are "critical" to
a project's success. Even though an owner is highly exposed to all of the risks shown, his
ability to adequately manage those risks (as compared to the other parties) is considerably
weaker. Out of 19 risks outlined in figure 4.1, 53% of them negatively position the owner to
deal with potential difficulties encountered during the life of a project. From the total amount
of risks analyzed, more than half raise serious questions as to the reasoning behind the
established risk distribution scheme. Risks with the weakest relationship between potential
exposure and degree of control are those which have prompted most of the contractual
customization seen in recent years:
* Differences between Design Criteria and 100% Design
* Constructability of Design
* Redesign if Over Budget
* Coordinating with other Work
* Quality Control & Quality Assurance
* Differing Subsurface Conditions
* Design Defects
* Strikes or Labor disputes
* Weather Conditions
* Catastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake
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Warranties for Facility Performance
Due to the large share of risks which are allocated to the owner under traditional project
delivery, the profitability and success of not only the project, but of all parties involved,
becomes highly sensitive to an owner's ability to control risk (See Figure 4.11).
To give an example, lets assume an owner with an average knowledge of construction
(where most owners build 1 or two projects in their life span) and a project of average
complexity ( say corporate headquarters). The project would consist of a traditional
agreement based on AIA contract forms (A- 11 l/A-201/A-141) and a lump sum contract
between the GC and the Owner. For the purpose of analysis, cost and time of completion
will not be specified, but instead will be established under the assumption of a fair estimate of
both. Though the model takes into consideration over 110 variables which address very
specific conditions over a wide range of project variations, the general position of an
individual can be approximated with fair accuracy from the previously mentioned variables
(See Chapter 3 for a detail view of the VRA model). Having established the former, the risk
position undertaken by him would be affected by his comparative capacity to manage
accepted risks through: Professional Expertise, Participation on the problem resolution
process, the Criticality of the risk relative to the exposure of the participant, Criticality of a
risk relative to the success of the project, the level of Complexity of the project, and the
Degree of Control over the potential risk.
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Using these variables under the former project and analyzing how they would be relative to
the position assumed by the owner, his overall risk positioning in the described venture
would be as follows:
Figure 4.2 Owner's Risk Positioning in the Traditional Method
Degr ee of
Project
Corn plex i t
Factor:
Factor of
Strength in
Negotiation:
Degree of Exposure:
Factor of Strength in Negotiation:
Project Complexity Factor:
Source: See Appendix: B-i for Calculation of Values
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Under traditional contracts, the owner bears the responsibility and risk for design
errors discovered during construction. Using the traditional approach, it is the owner who
essentially takes ownership of the drawings and specifications, and it is the owner who
warrants to the construction contractor that the drawings and specifications are complete and
free from error.
Yet under most circumstances (as shown in Figure 4.2), owners have a limited
comparative capacity to control risks. As said before, by statically allocating risks to project
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participants without considering the potential increased exposure caused by their ability to
control them, the traditional method puts most owners in a weak position to manage their
level of exposure. Because owners will be financially exposed to any escalation in cost, their
limited ability to control the direction of the venture limits their ability to properly position
themselves. Given their weak positioning in terms of risk control, the traditional delivery
system causes owners to be both defensive and conservative during the construction process.
Still, what is most interesting is that the other parties are no better off. Though the
contractual risk allocations are not equivalent for all of the parties involved, the ability of an
owner to control the risks will directly influence all three main participants (designer, builder,
owner).
4.2.2 The Builder
Of the three main participants in the "traditional" delivery of a project, the builder is
the second most at risk relative to the "typical" risk sharing scheme. Compared to the owner,
the builder or GC, accepts the second largest amount of risk. Figure 4.3 shows some of the
major risks which are assigned to the builder by traditional project delivery. Looking at the
mapping of risk in the table, it can be seen that the builder is in an advantageous position
compared to the owner. Given the risks which the builder "contractually" accepts, one
would expect him to be in a safe position in the venture. Yet if this was so, builders would
theoretically face minimal amounts of litigation. As most know, this is not exactly the case.
As agreed by many, and as explained in previous chapters, the United States construction
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Figure 4.3 Builder's Contractually Accepted Risks under the Traditional Method
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Degree of Control
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industry is plagued with litigation. As portrayed in the previous table, the contractor has
probably as much exposure as the owner. However his ability to control the risk he has
contractually accepted is sharply improved. Because the owner can potentially accept risks
which directly influence his level of exposure, but yet has little ability to control, a great
amount of "friction" gets built into the system. By analyzing their respective position on a
traditional Design-Bid-Build venture, it can be seen that there is a strong disparity in their
respective conditions.
As the model points out in Figure 4.4, the builder enjoys a much lower exposure, for
the most part because of a higher capacity to control the risks received through the contract.
Still, even though degrees of risk and exposure vary between participants, their potential
exposure grows as a correlated function of each other's position. As this shows, no matter
where the risk is put in the contract, it will find a way of affecting those who have the higher
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capacity to control it. For example, if a contractor indemnifies the owner from "all" liability
for unidentified underground conditions, it does not mean the risk has disappeared, but just
means that it has changed form into a premium.
Figure 4.4 Contractor vs. Owner's Risk Positioning
Owner Builder
Degree of Exposure: 7 Degree of Exposure:
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: Factor of Strength in Negotiation:
Project Complexity Factor: Project Complexity Factor:
Source: See Appendix: B-1 Source: See Appendix: B-2
Yet, if the risk of underground conditions is given to someone who is not able to have control
over it (with a premium for example), the risk could potentially induce increased costs to all
involved by increased litigation and time.
4.2.3 The Designer
Of the traditional tri-partite arrangement used for project delivery, the designer is
probably the one with the least amount of contractually placed responsibility. Still, A/E's
present the best example of how contractual risk shifting has ultimately served as a
weakening tactic for the design industry. Applying the model to the same project which was
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used for the owner's example, the cause for the currently weakening position of designers in
traditional project delivery becomes more clear. To show this, figure 4.5 outlines the risks
which an A/E would traditionally accept on a contract of this type. Having already seen the
risk scheme for the owner and the contractor, the disparate position between the architect and
the other two participants becomes highly evident.
Figure 4.5 Designer's Contractually Accepted Risks under the Traditional Method
Risk/
Responsibility
Diferences between design crteria &
100% Design
Design Defects
Drivers
Still, many designers neglect too see the problem. By choosing to step away from
risk, they are facing an ever increasing exposure to liability. As explained in the beginning
chapters, by diminishing their share of contractually accepted risks, designers are not
strengthening their position, but instead eroding it more and more. The VRA model
graphically represents this trend by plotting the previously mentioned relationships between
control, project complexity and strength of negotiation, as they affect the position of the
participants in the delivery of a capital project.
Figure 4.6 demonstrates how the relationship of the overall exposure of designers
increases as they relinquish their ability to control risk. The model shows in their negotiating
position, how their diminished participation has weakened their position in the value chain.
From the previous table, one might expect designers to have a minimal level of exposure. Still,
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designers today feel increasingly exposed to risk. The following figure demonstrates how this
it true by taking into consideration how risk aversion has affected their ability to control risk.
Figure 4.6 depicts not only what is happening to designers, but to all involved in misguided
practices of risk allocation.
Figure 4.6 Designer's Risk Positioning in the Traditional Method
Degree of
Ex posure:
rroj e
Complei
Facto
Factor of
Strength in
Negotiation:
Degree of Exposure: 3.54
Factor of Strength In Negotiation:
Project Complexity Factor:
Source: See Appendix: B-3 for Calculation of Values
As demonstrated through the model, participant exposure diminishes in direct
proportion to control over risks. Eliminating risks from the contract (as seen in the case of the
Designer), causes the reverse effect of that which could be "logically" expected. As risk is
given away, those who really have the capacity to manage the risk loose control over it, thus
affecting the riskiness of the project as a whole. With the model the research is able to show
that contrary to general belief risk aversion weakens, instead of strengthening, the position of
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project participants. The misguided allocation of risk has increased the friction in the system
by supporting the establishment of disparate bargaining powers in the process.
4.3 Design/Build -A Step in the Right Direction
4.3.1 How is it Different?
Unlike traditional project delivery which divides the design and construction services
between the two separate entities, design/build places the design and construction
responsibility under a single entity. For the most part, design/builders provide services in one
of three forms: (1) architect subcontracting construction; (2) contractor subcontracting
design; or (3) joint venture of an architect and a contractor. Though there are specialized
entities that work solely on design/build, it is far more common to encounter one of the three
previously mentioned forms (See Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7 Design/Build Delivery System
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Because there exist far fewer relationships in which an owner must participate or over which
an owner need exercise supervision, some owners have modified the process to what is
known as Bridging39 (See figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8 Design/Build Delivery with Bridging
All that bridging does is place a fiduciary party for the owner between himself and the
design/builder. This fiduciary agent is normally an architect or construction manager that
serves as an administrator of the project for the owner. The responsibilities of this
administrator may include project definition, selection of the design/builder, review of the
design and construction documents, and supervisory responsibilities over the actual
construction project. While the design/builder provides owners with today's version of the
master builder, "the enlightened builder, or the architect trained in construction who, once
upon a time, integrated design and construction at the building site". The supervisor covers
for the time and management capabilities that while necessary, most owners don't have.
39 The term "bridging" was developed by George Henry, FAIA.
Charles B. Thomsen, Bridging, The Architects Handbook of Professional Practice
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In terms of contractual and financing methods there exist various options for the
owner. Design/Build allows for more liberty in creative financing than the traditional method.
Though there are many possibilities in terms of financing, the following four are some of the
most used ones40:
1. Traditional Design/Build : Closest to traditional financing. Owner pays the design/builder
throughout the design and construction of the project. Further analysis on risk allocation for
design/build will focus on this type of project, though the general ideas may apply to all of
the other three options.
2. Turnkey : In this option the design/builder provides the financing for the project. The
design/builder delivers the project for a set price and by a certain date. Upon completion and
payment by the owner, the design builder turns the project (key) to the owner.
3. Build-Leaseback : In a build leaseback the design/builder provides the financing for the
project and retains ownership at completion. The design/builder then leases the building back
to the owner as if he were only a client. The lease terms are usually negotiated prior to the
commencement of the construction.
4. Build-Operate-Transfer : This option, which has been mostly used for large infrastructure
projects in developing countries, recurs once again to the design/builder for financing. Here the
design/builder operates the project for a pre-determined amount of time and then returns the
project to the owner.
4o Thomas J. Ragonetti & William H. Brierly, Assessing the Owner's Risk in Design Build Projects,
American Bar Association Forum on the Construction Industry San Francisco, California April 1995
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Likewise, and similar to traditional project delivery, design/build can also be defined
in terms of the method chosen for payment. As described by the same authors mentioned
before, some of the most common varieties include 41:
1. Lump Sum : In this type of contract the design/builder agrees to build the project,
including supplying all labor and materials, for a specified dollar amount or "lump sum".
2. Cost-Plus-a-Fee : For this contract, the design/builder agrees to do the project for all of the
subcontractors' prices for labor and materials (the "costs") plus a design/builder's fee of
either a specified dollar amount or a percentage of the costs of the project. Whether included
as part of the design builder's fee, or separately stated as a cost of the project, the
design/builder will also be typically paid for "overhead" and "general conditions", that is, a
share of the design/builder's general overhead costs which may be fairly apportioned to the
project, as well as reimbursement for the general collection of typical construction project
tasks and materials performed or supplied by a design/builder which are essential to the
smooth running of the project, but generally defy precise categorical description. In a pure
Cost-Plus-a-Fee contract, at the outset there is theoretically no cap set on the ultimate
project price because the project price will be the result of all the individual subcontract
costs, then unknown, plus the design/builder's fee.
3. Cost Plus a Fee Subject to a GMP : In this version of the Cost-Plus-a-Fee contract, the
design/builder will agree with the owner that those costs plus the design/builder's fee, will not
exceed a guaranteed maximum price. Unlike the lump sum approach where the owner's cost is
known at the time of contracting, and unlike the pure cost-plus-a-fee option where the
owner's ultimate cost for the project is unknown at the time of contracting, here the owner
will know since the first day he may pay less than, but never more than, the guaranteed
maximum price set.
"4 Thomas J. Ragonetti & William H. Brierly, Assessing the Owner's Risk in Design Build Projects,
American Bar Association Forum on the Construction Industry San Francisco, California April 1995
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4. Unit Price : This contract is done by having the design/builder agree to specified unit
prices for specific items of material and labor. Here the ultimate contract price becomes the
sum of the total number of "units" of material and labor required to build the project.
Still, while all of the above mentioned could be seen as common variations of the design/build
process, there are some other approaches which have rendered equally good effects using a
very different approach.
4.3.1.1 Partnering for Design/Build
The term partnering is being used with more and more frequency today. Incorporating
no formal contractual agreement between the participants, the approach has been a new way
of addressing the friction that has negatively influenced the relationship between participants
in traditional project delivery. As explained by Daniel M. Yamshon:
" In light of the history of not only construction disputes, but of the field experience with
the unexpected constantly present, it makes sense that a method that can be considered
analogous to "premediation" of conflicts before they arise might be extremely useful 42
Partnering is a collaborative contracting process that focuses on dispute prevention,
rather than on dispute resolution. The concept was created in response to many of the
relationship problems which were mentioned in the first two chapters. The partnering
process thus tries to create a framework for teambuilding, where open communication,
commitment to common goals, mutual respect, and trust, can be developed. In an article by
42 Daniel M. Yamson, Partnering for Design/Build, American Bar Association Forum on the Construction
Industry San Francisco, California April 1995
Chapter 4 Innovative Contract Strategies for Project Delivery:
The Search for a Better Way
David P. Johnson, Senior Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, partnering is traced to
contracts involving DuPont Engineering and Fluor Daniel in the 1980's4 3
To better illustrate what a partnering agreement encompasses, a copy of the American
Arbitration Association's sample clause is reproduced in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9 AAA's Sample Partnering Clause
"In order to complete this contract most beneficially for all parties, the parties to this
contract agree to form a partnering relationship. This partnering relationship will draw on the
strengths of each party in achieving a quality project. Within days of the date of
execution of this contract, the parties will request form the American Arbitration Association
the appointment of a neutral facilitator for the partnering retreat. The partnering retreat will
take place as soon as is practicable, but in any case within days of the date of execution
of this contract. The parties to this contract agree to good faith participation in such a
partnering retreat. Individual participation in such partnering retreat shall be agreed upon by
the parties, but shall include at least the following project personnel:
[list personnel here]
The cost of administering the partnering retreat and the fees and expenses of the partnering
facilitator shall be borne equally by the contracting parties"
Source: Dispute Resolution Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 June 1993
The idea of partnering can be applied over a wide array of contractual arrangements. However
an analysis of the general effects under a traditional contract shows how it is that so many
industry participants have found great success in its application 44
Looking at Figure 4.10, it can be seen how the position of a participant would be
affected. Though this figure uses the A/E as the basis for comparison, the example is
applicable to the general effect of partnering on capital project delivery. Figure 4.10
43 David P. Johnson, Partnering in Government Contracts, The Ultimate Dispute Resolution?, World
Arbitration and Mediation Report October, 1990
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demonstrates how partnering influences the strength of negotiation of a "partner", thus
diminishing his overall risk exposure.
Figure 4.10 The Effect of Partnering on a Participant's Risk Exposure
Partnering No Partnering- "Traditional"
Degree of Degree of
Exposure: Expoe ur9:
Project
Complexit
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Proj ect
Complexl t
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Degree of Exposure: 2.91 Degree of Exposure:
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 345 Factor of Strength in Negotiation:
Project Complexity Factor: Project Complexity Factor:
Source: See Appendix: B-4 Source: See Appendix: B-3
Partnering is a perfect example of what changing the system and not the contracts
means. As many owners have found out (Industry Task Force on Partnering 1989), the
diminished friction achieved by the lubrication effect of partnering has translated to financial
gains for all involved in the process. Addressing the problems which were depicted by the
application of the VRA model on the traditional method analysis, partnering is the most
recent search for finding balance between the participants in project delivery. The
introduction of partnering has helped to induce increased fluidity in the process.
44 Specification of project or contract type is not necessary due to the fact that the effectiveness of partnering
depends not on contract type, but on the willingness of participants to adopt the process.
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4.3.2 The Benefits of Design/Build
Design/Build addresses many of the inefficiencies that have created problems on
traditional project delivery. In essence, design/build brings both design and construction
together under varying configurations in order to address the previously mentioned barriers
affecting time, construction costs and flexibility to innovate. Design/Build achieves this in
various ways.
First of all, design/build helps "fast-track" projects. By combining and overlapping
the design and construction functions, the contractor can begin work on excavation, site work,
and possibly foundation work before the final plans are finished. Because of its approach,
design/build allows the construction project to begin work at a point where under traditional
project delivery, the designer is still preparing the plans in order for the owner to later send
out the RFPs. For owners who will incur in heavy financing costs, or for whom time of
completion is of extreme importance (such as pharmaceuticals), the fast-track nature of
design/build allows them to finish projects in less time than the traditional method.
Second, and most relevant as compared to other methods, design/build allows owners
the benefit (or advantage) of having single entity responsibility. Because of the nature of
design/build, the owner needs to look to only one entity in order to address any design or
construction problem. As is expressed by many owners, this is a welcome alternative to the
situation commonly found in the "traditional" method were the contractor typically points
his finger at the architect, and the architect points his at the contractor.
Finally, design/build may offer savings on specific projects because of its combination
of design and construction services. Time associated savings will be achieved as a result of the
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"fast-track' nature of the process. In addition design/build also allows for savings on projects
where the design is not detailed and may be repeated in several locations. In industries where
an owner may require a single type of building with the same design details in every location,
the design build method offers substantial savings over the traditional method option.
Design/Build could also be the only option, as in the case of extremely complex projects that
require close interaction between design and construction.
4.3.3 Legal Exposure of its Participants
An analysis of design/build's risk allocation presents interesting contrasts between its
practices and those of the traditional method. Looking at the basic scheme of risk for
design/build, it can be seen that the owner faces a totally different environment of contractual
obligations.
As seen in Figure 4.11, design/build takes much of what was traditionally the owner' s
responsibility and puts it on the hands of the design/builder. Different from the traditional
method, design/build brings up front the allocation of risk and thus provides an environment
which rewards risk acceptance. In this way, Design/Build's structure acknowledges the idea
that risk is like energy: neither created nor destroyed, but instead capable of assuming
different forms (and residing in different hands) depending upon project delivery
methodology and contract format. While design/build provides an excellent opportunity for
most applications, it is not what may be called a "perfect" solution. For design/build to work
under the currently available formats owners must be aware of were potential obstacles may
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reside, and how they stand on the overall risk sharing scheme, depending on the risks they
accept.
Figure 4.11 Traditional Risk Allocation Compared to the Typical Design-Build Contract
Typical Risk Allocation in "Traditional" Typical Risk Allocation in
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4.3.3.1 The Owner
One of the biggest potential risks to an owner using design/build is single source
responsibility. Under the traditional project delivery the owner can recover, both from the
contractor and the architect. In most cases this provides the owner with at least two sources
of recovery in case something goes wrong. Because in design/build there is only one source for
recovery, owner' s must pay special attention to the financial situation of the design/builder
chosen for the project.
In some cases, closely related to the risks attendant with single source liability are the
risks associated with a special purpose entity formed to do the project. Very often
design/build contracts are performed under special purpose entities or one-time joint ventures
between a contractor and an architect. Because of the legal and financial characteristics of
these entities, owners must be careful to make sure that in the case of a claim those entities
will have the financial capabilities to respond, and that their organizational structures will not
shield them from liability. Owners must make sure that entities formed posses the financial
merits and are formed legally in such a way that their resources are available to respond to
any claims encountered during the delivery process.
One of the most mentioned criticisms regarding design/build is the alleged lack of
check and balances. Contrasting design/build, in the traditional method the contractor
theoretically review the plans before bidding/negotiation and before and during the
construction. On the other hand the architect has some level of responsibility to review the
contractors work and thus serve in a fiduciary relationship to the owner. Given that
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design/build blends both capabilities into one entity, owners must pay close attention to the
capabilities of the design/builder chosen as otherwise there will not be any other checks and
balances.
Another problem also commonly associated with design build is that the combination
of services may result in a loss of independent design or architectural functions. In
design/build the designer is vulnerable to be pressured by the contractor to maintain or
increase profit margins in the project at the possible expense of design quality.
Adding to the above concerns, there is also the problem of insurance coverage.
Insurance companies, though currently increasing their available range of coverage for
design/build ventures, have traditionally been a major obstacle to the process. By combining
design and construction into a single entity, projects may lack the necessary coverage for
design errors and omissions. The combination of functions may also result in the
design/builder not carrying sufficient liability insurance. Owners should pay careful attention
to this and consult with a knowledgeable broker or insurance company representative who
will be able to determine if the design/builder possesses the necessary insurance capabilities
to cover losses in case the project runs into problems.
Finally, many states' licensing requirements affect whether an architect or contractor
may perform design/build legally. In some states, architects that do not have a contractor's
license may be blocked for delivering construction services, and vice versa. Other states
require a separate license for the design build entity. As in all the other cases, owners better
make sure that the entity formed is legal, and how the local state laws and regulations may
affect the operation of the design builder chosen.
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Still, even though design/build does have a lot of potential pitfalls, it is yet an excellent
response to what the market is asking form the construction industry. Owners want less
problems, more speed, and a better product. Design/build does require a high level of
expertise from the owner and it offers definite advantages if managed well. Different from the
traditional method, which establishes a more rigid allocation of risk, design/build allows the
owner to, and I say again, "potentially", mold the risk allocation to his level of expertise and
thus assume better control over the project. If a project like the one used for the traditional
method example was used to represent the participants position in the project, it would be
seen that the owner may significantly lower his exposure by actively allocating risks which he
Figure 4.12 Owner's Risk Positioning in Design/Build.
Degree of
Exposure:
Project
Complexit
Fact or:
Factor of
St rengt h in
Negot iat ion:
Degree of Exposure: 2.00
Factor of Strength in Negotiation:
Project Complexity Factor:
Source: See Appendix: B-5 for Calculation of Values
may feel unable to control. Applying the VRA model to a hypothetical situation similar to
the one mentioned in section 4.2.1, but using design/build as the delivery vehicle for the
project, the situation of the owner can be represented clearly ( See Figure 4.12).
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Interestingly enough and different to design-bid-build, design/build though limiting the
degree of "Control" an owner may have over decisions regarding potential risks for the
project, proportionally decreases the "Criticality" of the risks by consciously allocating
control over them to the design/builder. While an owner may chose to carry more or less risk
personally, the relationship would remain constant thus always helping to diminish his
"Exposure' in the project. In terms of project complexity and strength of negotiation, the
owner has complete initial negotiation capabilities to allocate risk as the design/builder and he
see fit and are able to compensate for. Because of this capacity to consciously allocate risks,
the owner thus increases his "Strength of Negotiation", but puts it all up front in the project
delivery process. Still, it must be admitted that this gives him an initial level of flexibility, but
does limit his capacity to exert pressure later on if any changes come along.
4.3.3.2 The Design/Builder
The design/builder presents an excellent example of what the benefits of risk
acquisition means. While is true that the benefits and control which individual design/builders
may have will be directly proportional to their respective capacities to manage and control
the risk they accept, they are much better positioned to take full advantage of their position
relative to risk allocation. As is reflected in the risk positioning map presented in Figure 4.13,
design/builders are favored by an extremely high negotiating position. Given that the
design/builder has a high level of control and expertise over the potential risk sources, his
negotiating position is therefore strengthened. Serving both as designer and builder, the
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design/builder enjoys a high factor of strength in negotiation that is influenced by his larger
participation in conflict resolution and his strengthened professional capabilities to mange
situations which may potentially affect his overall exposure. Though the owner has a slightly
weaker negotiating position as compared to the design/builder, he compensates by having a
potentially lower exposure ( See Figure 4.13)
Figure 4.13 Design/Builder's vs. Owner's Risk Positioning in Design/Build.
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Looking at the calculation for both of the model applications, it can be seen that the
design builder, as compared to the owner, has a much higher level of control over risk. Still,
the owner maintains a safe level of exposure by lowering the criticality of the risk relative to
his exposure by transferring it to a single source, the design/builder. The design/builder on the
other hand, though having a larger share of risk, has more control and thus will (theoretically)
be compensated accordingly, as agreed by both at the beginning of the venture.
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4.4 Construction Management
The Construction Management system was developed as an alternative to general
contracting (GC) and design/build (DB). Though the three systems use the same construction
industry resources, they differ significantly in the way they contract for the necessary
resources. In construction management, the CM becomes an extension of the owner's
capabilities in contracting and construction, just as an A/E becomes an extension in areas of
design. As a fiduciary agent to the owner, a peer relationship is created between the CM and
the A/E through appropriate provisions in their separate contracts. A functional delivery
team consisting of the owner, A/E and CM is established. Through this relationship the
owner and the architect have the necessary resources to analyze design and construction
alternatives as they relate to the overall cost and schedule of the project. As mentioned by
John L. Tishman45 in The Robert B. Harris Inaugural Lecture given in 1988 at The Center for
Construction Engineering and Management in the University of Michigan, the most
important aspect of the approach is that the owner is made totally aware of aesthetic,
schedule and cost trade-offs before making program and design decisions.
4.4.1 The Construction Management Approach
Though construction management originates from what its known as it's "pure" form
or Agency CM (ACM) (see Figure 4.14), there have been many variations to the
5 Tishman Realty & Construction Co., is generally acknowledged to have pioneered Construction Management
as a professional service, during the 1960's. Their first construction management assignment was Madison
Square Garden, in 1963. This was shortly followed by the John Hancock Center (1965) and New York's World
Trade Center (1967).
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Figure 4.14 Agency Construction Management
approach. There are three main branches (with their respective individual forms) coming out
of the strict agent form of the CM system46(See Figure 4.15) :
(a) Extended Services Forms (XCM) : This form of construction management permits the
CM to perform a multi-role as either an AE/CM or a CM/CONTRACTOR and or
CONSTRUCTOR. Though XCM has variations of its own, in each variation, the initially
contracted services are extended to include one or more additional services.
(b) Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMPCM) : Also referred to as "contractor" CM, this
version of construction management permits the CM, at a late point in design, to amend the
agency agreement in order to provide a GMP to the owner. Once the GMP is given, the CM
becomes involved in a dual role as both a CM and a Contractor. The role introduces several
options to the contract (See Figure 4.15). Because the CM assumes contracting risk, he is
generally permitted to mitigate risks through various options such as : negotiating with the
owner, competing with bidders and/or holding some or all construction contracts. GMPCM
requires exact contract definition and mutual understanding of responsibilities.
(c) Owner Construction Management (OCM) : This final variation of the ACM system
places the owner in the performance position of the CM. The owner absorbs the CM
responsibilities according to his in-house capabilities. If the total requirement exceeds his
46 Committee on Construction Management, Qualification and Selection of Construction Managers with
Suggested Guidelines for Selection Process, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 113,
No. 1, March, 1987
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capabilities, he strengthens them by adding appropriate staff for the project or hires specific
services from a CM firm.
Figure 4.15 Fundamental Matrix of Services Provided by the CM
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Source: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 113, No. 1, March, 1987
Still, for the purpose intended in this research, the "pure" approach provides the best
empirical environment to study the relationships and risk sharing practices involved in
construction management. Because "pure" construction management retains a strict agency
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posture throughout project delivery, it's form permits a better analysis of participant
positioning.
4.4.2 The Risk Scheme
An important point regarding the risk sharing scheme of construction management is
that under the "pure" agency form, CM services are considered as a literal extension of the
owner' s ability and capacity to deliver a project. As mentioned by Committee on
Construction Management:
"By engaging the services of a CM, the owner gainfully mitigates the risks inherent to project
delivery through an agreement to expertly manage them. He does not transfer any risks as he
does when engaging a general contractor. Therefore, the services of the CM (though different
in content) should be considered from the same perspective as those of the design
professional and not the general contractor 47 "
The function of the CM in agency construction management is to help the owner deal
with the potential of liability generated by the complex interaction of the numerous
contractors on the job. As expressed by the Committee on Construction Management, by
equating risk exposure to risk value, the CM identifies the risks, evaluates them, and
appropriately allocates them in the owner's best interests. Though in essence most risks in
project delivery are operational rather than financial, the CM is responsible for adequately
managing the project in order to diminish the potential for those risks to result in financial
liability to the owner.
47 Qualification and Selection of Construction Managers with Suggested Guidelines for Selection Process,
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 113, No. 1, March, 1987
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4.4.2.1 Owner
As the movement away from traditional project delivery has continued, the role of the
owner has been under a constant redefinition. Construction Management, like Design/Build,
gives the owner a level of flexibility never before available. The level of flexibility provided to
the owner is even greater considering the variations in construction management (like
GMPCM) which transfer a large part of the financial risk to the construction manager. The
advent of construction management has placed the owner in a much better position than he
ever was. When once the owner was able to count on the architect as his expert agent, the
architect now is extremely reluctant to take the risk which his expert management would
impose.
Still, construction mangers not only found that they could mange the risk efficiently
without incurring in the owners risk (ACM), but that they could share the risk of the owner
and contractor (GMPCM) and still find high levels of profits in the acquisition of those risks.
Construction Management is extremely helpful in proving what this research puts forward by
helping to answer a simple question. How have construction managers been able to control
the risks which architects found overwhelming?
The answers to this question are readily explained by applying VRAM to the
position of the participants. Using the ACM form of construction management provides the
best example for demonstrating why construction mangers are able to profit from risk
management and risk acquisition. Because in agency construction management the
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construction manger merely performs as an agent to the owner, he does not take any of the
owner's risk but agrees to expertly mange it. As said before, owners do not have the
necessary capabilities to do so.
Figure 4.16 Position of Owner in CM vs. Traditional Project Delivery
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When architects stepped away form risk management, they opened the doors to those
who were willing to manage the risk. By pro-actively managing risk, CMs were able have a
higher level of control which not only benefited them as professionals, but placed the owner
on a much better position. The owner was now given a way to acquire the management
capabilities which had made him vulnerable under traditional project delivery. As seen in
Figure 4.16, when you compare the position of the owner in ACM, to that in the traditional
project delivery, his degree of control is greatly improved.
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Construction managers realized that owners were not able to adequately control the risk.
Construction management accepts and takes advantage of the fact that risk exposure is
relative to control. In ACM the exposure faced by the owner is greatly reduced by his
increased level of control. Still, as the model shows, not only does the owner enjoy a higher
level of control through construction management, but also has much stronger bargaining
power. By placing the construction manager as fiduciary agent, the owner increases his ability
to participate in the resolution of conflicts by acquiring the expert services of someone with
a much higher level of professional expertise to mange the situation.
4.4.2.2 Construction Manager
The construction manager is the perfect example of the profit potential attainable by
actively seeking to manage (ACM) or acquire risk (GMPCM). Under the agency form of
construction management, the CM gains competitive advantage by expertly managing a set of
risks which were otherwise left to chance. By managing the risk, not only does the
construction manger increase his control capacity on the given project, but acquires the
expertise that architects are losing by neglecting to deal with the problem. As mentioned in
the introductory chapters, as professionals step away from responsibilities, they force
themselves out of the value chain by decreasing their number of value activities.
If the position of the construction manger is plotted against that of the architect in
traditional project delivery, it can be seen that the CM is under much less exposure. This
decreased exposure in many ways is similar that of the owner which he serves. As an agent of
the owner, the construction manager becomes the owner himself. Still, different to the real
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owner, the construction manger is an expert which benefits by a high level of experience and
control.
Figure 4.17 Position of CM vs. that of the Designer in Traditional Project Delivery
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On the other hand, as shown in previous sections, the architect under traditional
project delivery has a very low level of control over risk. When once his professional
expertise to mange risk was competitive to that of other professions, his aversion tendencies
lead him to lose these capabilities by diminishing his participation in the decision process.
4.4.2.3 Designer
Architects are facing an ever weakening position in the value system that lead to the
advent of construction management to cover for gaps in their services. By covering the gaps
which architecture had left behind, construction management relieved part of the pressure that
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their mismanagement of risk was having on the profession. As has been said before, the
biggest problem faced by architects under traditional project delivery is a weak control over
risk, which when coupled with a decreasing level of professional expertise, has weakened
their negotiating position and increased their level of exposure.
Under a contract for construction management the architect becomes better able to
manage risk. Though some architects have maintained the necessary skills to appropriately
manage risk, most have not. Comparing the models for both, those professional capabilities
that architecture has lost by lack of practice become evident (See Figure 4.18).
Figure 4.18 Position of Architect in CM vs. Architect in Traditional Project Delivery
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What the previous models fail to show is the relationship of decreased responsibility
to profitability. By decreasing their scope of services, architects also gave away part of their
fees. The decreased levels in profitability experienced by architects in the last decade were
caused by their increased reluctance to manage construction. Now that they have given this
ro -e-f
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capacity away, they face an uphill battle to gain it back as they have split the market by
lowering the barriers of entry into the traditional realm of architecture.
4.4.2.4 Contractor
Contrary to the previously examined parties, the contractor faces little change in his
risk scheme as a result of adopting ACM. Though under guaranteed maximum price a
contractor begins to share his risk with the construction manager, the agency form leaves his
contractual exposure intact ( See Figure 4.19).
Figure 4.19 Position of Contractor in CM vs. Builder in Traditional Project Delivery
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Source: See Appendix: B-2
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Source: See Appendix: B-IO
For small to medium sized projects the need of a construction manager could easily be
questioned. However, large projects have proved CMs to be an invaluable resource. As
.s
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project complexity begins to increase, exerting a high level of control over the project
becomes increasingly harder. Even though a contractor may have the necessary professional
capabilities to adequately manage risk, the ratio of Degree of Exposure and Strength in
Negotiation, relative to Project Complexity, will decrease. It is when this ratio decreases that
the presence of the construction manager becomes an asset to the contractor. By having a
construction manager on board, the contractor can maintain (or maybe increase) his degree of
control of risk and also limit a possible escalation in the criticality of issues due to the higher
complexity of the project.
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5.1 The SLIM System
Owners, designers, contractors, construction managers and others have a number of
options to protect themselves from liability. Risk management may be defined as an
organized approach to identifying and dealing with risk. As most would acknowledge,
adequate risk management ( through insurance or otherwise) is to the benefit of all involved in
project delivery. Yet, how can it be effectively achieved if everyone is looking out for their
individual interests?
The development of the Single Liability Insurance Model comes from the search for
common ground in this highly fragmented industry. As was demonstrated in the previous
chapter, even in the most "promising" of delivery alternatives, there is an inescapable level of
friction that's always carried by the system. Risk assessment, risk allocation and risk
prevention are only useful when one has the control and the interest to make use of them.
Insurance plays a major role in the development of any risk management program
designed to shift designated risks to a financially strong party who, for an agreed premium
amount, is willing to assume some or all of the liability for the loss. Yet, while insurance is
the one instrument in which most participants rely in order to manage their risks, it is the
exact same one over which the industry has the least amount of control. While an individual
firm may have a better loss history than an another and therefore influence their cost of
insurance, it would never be able to directly influence the overall level of exposure which it
may represent to commercial carriers, as this will vary relative to the actions of various other
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participants which have no direct interest in the potential losses faced by the former. While
the concept of insurance rests on this fact, if one could indeed develop a pool large enough as
to have the capacity to negotiate with commercial carriers, the potential for savings could be
quite substantial.
Insurance costs today represent from 5-20% of all costs incurred by participants in
project delivery. While owners may chose to directly carry insurance for projects (Wrap-Up
insurance), most will indirectly carry its costs through the contracts with the different
parties. Why not take advantage of this? If there was anyway to diminish coverage costs, not
only would profitability increase overall, but whoever is able to do so would enjoy significant
competitive advantage. In the search to answer the same question, various other industries
have come up with what are called "captive" insurance companies.
5.1.1 The Captive Insurance Company
Captives work much like commercial carriers do, in the sense that they are in the
business of insuring and reinsuring risks. Still, what differentiates them from other commercial
carriers is their concentration on providing coverage for their sponsors.
There are two common arrangements under which captives furnish protection. First,
owners remit premiums to their insurance subsidiaries, which retain a predetermined amount
of liabilities on both an individual loss and aggregate yearly basis and cede the remainder to
commercial carriers. In the second form, referred to as fronting, parents insure risks directly
with conventional insurance companies which then reinsure specific portions of the coverages
with the captives of the insureds, thus gaining profits from otherwise sunk costs.
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For most companies risks are assumed to be in the form of speculative risks, or
fluctuations in demand for products. Given most company's capacity to adequately mitigate
these risks through good management, and also due to an absence of suitable transfer
mechanisms, most firms retain these risks in-house. For the construction industry,
speculative risks take the form of fluctuations in material and equipment costs. Yet, as is the
case of other industries, construction has been able to cope with these risks. Escalation
clauses and limited contract periods give sufficient shelter for most well managed projects.
Pure risks on the other hand, have proved harder to tame. Most construction firms
attempt to protect themselves from catastrophic losses (those beyond their financial ability
to withstand) through external sources. Many, unwilling to trust to luck, shift the burden of
ruin from chance events such as fires or accidents to commercial insurers. These carriers
indemnify companies (often for losses in excess of stipulated amounts) in return for payment
of premiums.
The construction industry is heavily dependent on insurance at all levels in the value
chain ( See figure 5.1). In 1995 the U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance industry
wrote an estimated 258.00 billion dollars in premiums48 . As most participants seek
protection from insurance, there has been created what may be called "insurance
redundancy". Given the highly fragmented nature of the construction industry, insurance
coverage ( with the exception of wrap-ups) is commonly procured individually by the
different participants.
48 ENR Special Advertising Section: Insurance, August 28, 1995
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Figure 5.1 Insurance Redundancy in the Construction Industry
Insurance
Because there is no way of precisely knowing how claims are going to flow, insured parties
obtain "overlapping" coverages. The redundancy created, together with the inherent
uncertainty which insurers face in providing coverage for a capital projects, add up to
significant increases in the cost of delivery and promote litigation between insurers, and also
between insureds.
Yet, how willing are insurance companies to support models like this? In an interview
with Maureen McDonough, Contract Director for the Massachusetts Port Authority, the
answer was quite clear. Similar to what will be explained in more detail for the Single Liability
Insurance Model, Massport developed an insurance setup that will yield an estimated
35,000,000 million dollars in savings for Logan 200049. The model works quite simply. In
exchange for insuring all of their workers compensation contracts with a single carrier, the
carrier provides Massport with a 30% reduction in premiums. With an expected total cost (in
49 Renovation project for Boston's International Airport, 1996
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losses and premiums) of 84 million dollars, Massport gambles a potential 30% savings by
accepting to pay for any losses in excess of the reduced premium and up to the otherwise 100
percent of the cost. Massport is thus counting on its ability to manage the project in order to
keep losses under the reduced price. By placing 35 million dollars in potential savings (under
good management), the commercial carrier is giving Massport an excellent incentive, while at
the same time assuring for themselves a large pool of secured premiums, definitely a win/win
situation.
5.1.2 Single Liability Insurance Model
Captive insurance theory is the foundation for what consequently was named as the
Single Liability Insurance Model. In the search to reduce litigation and provide owners with a
single source of liability in the delivery of capital projects, industry participants developed
things like Design/Build, Partnering, and Construction Management. Yet, my work is founded
on the belief that in order for any of these methods to work to their fullest potential, a
framework that supports them must be developed first. Given that all of these approaches
are heavily dependent on team interaction, an appropriate environment for them must
adequately support three main things: (1) sharing of information, (2) cooperative risk
management through a centralized structure, and (3) an adequate balance of risk and return
between all participants.
The Single Liability Insurance Model was developed in the search to achieve this. As
its seen in the next figure, SLIM is structurally very similar to a captive insurance
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Figure 5.2 SLIM (Single Liability Insurance Model)
I I
Insurance CompanyI
company. Yet, the model contains a few, but extremely important deviations from the
traditional form of a captive. In the Single Liability Insurance Model form, there is what is
called a "deductible reserve". Even though this seems very similar to a captive (and in many
ways is) there is one main difference. For a captive there is normally a parent corporation (a
single entity) providing premium payments that go the their subsidiary (the captive) and
where return on the investment (from the premium payments) is kept for the "subsidiary".
Capital projects on the other hand, are not normally delivered by the construction industry
through any single entity, but instead through what many refer to as "virtual" corporations.
Virtual corporations are business entities which are built for a limited time with the purpose
of achieving a common goal. Even though these may take the form ofjoint ventures, or
partnerships (limited or general), most are simply arranged through the temporary contractual
relationship between the different participants in project delivery.
If correctly harnessed there is great strength in the nature of the virtual organization.
While the development of a captive reserve in any other industry would depend on the
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financial capacity of a single corporation, and also place all of the exposure on it alone, virtual
organizations have a natural way of diversifying that risk. Virtual organizations in
construction are formed by designers, consultants, contractors, sub-contractors,
manufacturers and dozens of other organizations which at different levels can be potentially
exposed to both the risk and return emanating form the project.
The SLIM system places the "deductible reserve" or "captive reserve" in such a way
as to benefit from the fragmented nature of the industry. Instead of having one company pay
and benefit from the investment in a captive, the SLIM model uses the "virtual" corporation
as the entity which will support the system. Every participant (designers, builders, sub-
contractors, and sub-consultants) adds to the pool. Contributions to the deductible pool are
based on the level of exposure, return and control of the participant. Further underwriting for
the individual, as in the case of use of normal carriers, would then be based on claim history.
Yet different from normal carriers, the entity participates in the establishment of the team.
Optimal conditions for this would be under the Design/Build or Construction Management
environments. As was shown in the analysis performed in chapter four with the application
of the Venture Risk Analysis Model, design/build and construction management provide the
levels of participation and control that are necessary to appropriately manage the
underwritten risk.
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5.2 Providing Protection Without Limiting Incentive
Another difference between SLIM and the "pure form" of captive insurance is in how
risk and return are allocated. In order for participants to be willing to share information and
actively participate in an entity of this kind, a balance between risk and return is necessary.
In order to do this the Single Liability Insurance Model does two things:
(1) proportionally distributes underwriting losses through all of the participants based on the
individually established contribution to the "deductible reserve"; and
(2) ) proportionally distributes underwriting profits through all of the participants based on
the individually established contribution to the "deductible reserve".
5.2.1 Return on Investment
Standard insurance arrangements call for the insured to pay premiums in advance of
estimated losses. Carriers subsequently pay claims from these accumulated funds. But the
payout period, especially for nonproperty losses, may extend over a lengthy period, perhaps
as much as five or ten years. Often, as in the case of the construction industry, claims with
"long tails" ( those taking considerable time to settle), provide carriers with investment
opportunities. Premiums collected but not distributed as claims payments can be invested
and earn interest ( often enough to cover for any underwriting losses incurred).
Using a system like the Single Liability Insurance Model, project delivery participants
may get a return on the money they invest for insurance. Like in captives, where sponsors
seek cash-flow benefits similar to those enjoyed by commercial carriers, under SLIM the
different reserve pool participants may enjoy the same benefits (for a better understanding of
this see sample Pro-Forma in Figure 5.3).
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Participants in the "virtual" organization can expect to realize investment income on their
individual input to the reserve. In addition to this, less demanding premium payment
schedules may be organized.
5.2.2 Stockholder Opportunity
Because different participants (like sub-contractors) may want be reimbursed for their
investment sooner than others, the money placed in the deductible reserve may take various
forms. Because the idea is to have the money for as long as possible, "participants" in the
pool could use the money to buy participation ( in the form of stock or otherwise) in the risk
which the captive may take on other projects. Yet, depending on the participant's position,
the insurance money invested may be reimbursed as soon as the project is done, or kept for
as long as the statute limitations may require in the given state (normally seven years).
5.2.3 Less Exposure for the Participants
By evenly distributing both risk and return, the system establishes a clear incentive to
cooperate. If the project goes well, everybody benefits, if the project goes wrong everybody
pays. Yet, under this system losses will never be catastrophic. The name "deductible" reserve
comes from the fact that all the money invested for insurance purposes, becomes in essence a
large deductible for the commercial carrier who will insure the excess risk over that deductible.
As a result of this, not only will every participant be covered for any claims which may come
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up as result of negligence from any of the parties involved, but the captive places a cap on the
incurred risk. The Single Liability Insurance Model strives to achieve a win-win situation for
everyone involved. Still, since people are people, and conflicts at a smaller or larger scale will
inevitably exist, all participants in the reserve must agree to resolve any disputes through an
openly selected binding arbitration committee.
5.2.4 Lower Cost of Coverage as Incentive for Good Performance
Given that human nature always seems to work against the possibility of a zero
dispute environment, even in a system which promotes cooperation, conflict will always arise.
In order to have better control over this, SLIM makes participants understand that their
influence on the profitability of the "team" will not only affect the success of the organization
as a whole, but that it will proportionally affect their individual standing in it.
The Single Liability Insurance Model gains its strength from the capacity to use the
diversity of participants in the delivery of any capital project. Together with the capacity to
gain a return on the insurance investment, SLIM provides an incentive system similar to that
provided by insurance companies, but as in the various other parts of the system, it too
contains some differences from "traditional" insurance. As participants invest money in
projects, they may take the money out (with interest if no losses have occurred) or leave it
(in whole or in part) in the deductible reserve. If a participant decides to leave (or not) the
money invested in the system, he could be remunerated through a percent reduction in future
premiums. This "reward" would be calculated as a function of two things: (1) the total
amount of money invested in the "deductible" reserve, and (2) his loss history with the
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"captive". In this way, good performance could theoretically lead to "free" insurance for the
participant depending on the size of future projects, and the overall risk exposure which they
might represent.
5.3 Risk Management under a Controlled Environment
Adequate risk management must permit the person assuming the risk to take both
physical and financial control over risk. In the development of SLIM, this was one of the
most difficult questions. How can a single entity assume all risk and yet have enough control
and financial stability to do so? When an insurance company assumes a certain amount of risk
in the construction industry, it is doing so with a limited amount of direct control over the
circumstances which may affect a project site. Even though commercial carriers take only
what are called "measured" risks, they still have no direct control (other than through
insurance inspectors) over the everyday affairs of a site.
On the other hand, design/build and construction management firms are in a much
better position. As was seen and demonstrated in the previous chapter, these two forms of
project delivery permit participants to have large amounts of "physical" control over risk.
Participants in these methods have more participation in decisions, higher professional
expertise, and higher control over decisions made. Because of this, both of these methods
serve as perfect frameworks on which to build the Single Liability model.
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5.3.1 Centralized Decision Structure
Under a construction management or design/build form, a firm covered by the Single
Liability Insurance Model would have clear advantages over any commercial carrier assuming
the same amount of risk. While collecting premiums, and thus having the same investment
benefits as a commercial carrier, the "captive" would be much better positioned to handle the
assumed risks. In both design/build and construction management, participants benefit from a
more centralized decision structure which limits the negative effects of fragmentation through
the centralization of the decision process. By having direct control over both design and
construction, the private carrier can greatly reduce his exposure to risk, thus placing him at a
competitive advantage with the commercial carrier.
5.3.2 Involvement of Ultimate Decision Maker
In order to have adequate control over risk, and the necessary influence over the
decision process, the owner must be an active participant in the allocation of risk. Static
allocation of risk through traditional documents has only served to blur the boundaries of
responsibility in project delivery. Owners (under most circumstances) have little knowledge
about construction, and thus tend to make uninformed decisions through the traditional
contracts.
Design/build and construction management not only provide a centralized decision
structure for everyone involved in the process, but also acknowledge the owner as the
ultimate decision maker through a dynamic allocation of risk. Serving as agents,
design/builders and construction managers have the capacity to help the owner early in the
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process identify what are the risks involved and what accepting them implies. Using a model
like the one being proposed here, is extremely useful, not only as a mitigation mechanism, but
also as a marketing tool to the captive group. Even if the owner is being provided with a
single source of liability, it is extremely important that he takes an active position in the risks
the project may have. Like the designer, the contractor, and the subcontractor, the owner is
also a participant in the distribution of risk. As the party with the biggest vested interest in
the project, the owner is key to achieving an adequate distribution of risk.
Depending on an owner's level of sophistication, he might be more or less interested
in assuming specific risks. Depending on this, the model would (as for every other participant
in the captive) provide the opportunity for him to assume direct risks through the contract
(cost-plus, unit pricing, specific clauses, etc.) and with that adjust his premiums. Different
from traditional project delivery (were risks are statically allocated many times under
unbalanced distributions), an unsophisticated owner, may decide to shift all risk to the
design/builder or construction manager, but yet leave a balanced organization which will be
able to balance risk and return without increasing the potential for internal conflict.
5.4 Benefits to the Participants
The adoption of a system like the one provided by the Single Liability Insurance
Model provides participants with a wide range of benefits. As has been explained in the
previous sections, participants would enjoy benefits in the form of decreased exposure,
higher return on investment and decreased litigation. Still, these are not by any means the
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only benefits that could potentially be derived from the system. While there is no way of
accurately predicting extreme cost years, self insurance models have the capacity to adjust
and deal with such conditions much better than large commercial carriers can.
5.4.1 Decreased Costs
When an owner, contractor or designer buys insurance from a commercial carrier he is
paying as part of his premium the overhead costs of the often extremely large commercial
carriers. Because overhead for commercial insurers can consume 30 percent or more of their
premiums, the provision of self insurance through a model like SLIM could significantly
reduce, if not eliminate, such expenses.
During years such as of 1985, 1990, 92 & 94, when U.S. Property and Casualty
Insurance results showed losses of 25, 21.2, 36 and 22.4 billion dollars respectively, huge
rate increases can have a major impact on the cost of project delivery"5 . Because commercial
premiums charges tend to reflect average group experiences, years in which underwriting
losses have been extreme, general market losses normally translate to rates which can be
excessive relative to the losses which a specific individual may have experienced. When this
happens, self insurance models like the one discussed here, can provide substantial savings to
anyone who is buying coverage.
o ENR Special Advertising Section: Insurance, August 28, 1995
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5.4.2 Less Exposure to Risk for Insurance Companies
SLIM delivers two substantial advantages for commercial carriers:
(1) First, by having the "safety" of a deductible like the one SLIM provides, commercial
insurance carriers would face a much smaller and better measured risk.
(2) Maintaining an adequate level of control over projects, adds up to large overhead costs
which carriers must incur in paying inspectors, and any other sub-consultants which may aid
in managing the risk. The Single Liability Insurance Model can significantly cut these costs by
providing carriers with a much better level of risk management, and thus a lower exposure to
risk.
5.4.3 Acquiring Tax Benefits
As explained by Patrick J. Davey in his report, Managing Risks Through Captive
Insurance Companies, captives like commercial carriers, establish reserves that defer taxes.
Because premiums paid to insurance companies are deductible, captives offer a potential
means of lowering income taxes for the participants in organizations like the one formed
through the Single Liability Insurance Model.
Through the establishment of insurance subsidiaries in selected foreign countries,
companies can sometimes gain additional tax advantages. Taxes, in places like Bermuda, offer
huge advantages to subsidiaries established there. Profits earned by these captives on the
insurance of overseas risks of their sponsors are, for the most part, non taxable domestically
until repatriated.
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5.4.4 Increased Bonding Capacity
Together with other benefits deriving from the investments made in the "deductible
reserve", the money invested there can be used to back up a larger bonding capacity. The
Single Liability Insurance Model can potentially increase the bonding capacity and costs of
reserve participants by providing sureties with three main advantages:
(1) stronger financial structure of insured: The establishment of the "deductible
reserve" may serve not only as a source of recovery for commercial carriers, but also
strengthen the financial standing of all participants by placing them under a financial
umbrella. Instead of having an individual contractor's capacity counting towards his
overall bonding capacity, the project leader ( CM or D/B) would now be able to insure
the completion of the project based on the joint capacity of the "team".
(2) single source ofaccountability : Both to the owner and the surety, there would be a
single source of accountability. As a single entity, the "deductible reserve" group would
perform in the same way a contractor would in the provision of a performance bond to
the owner. Because the "reserve' group would be insuring the proper completion of the
whole job, they (as a single entity) can provide the owner and the surety with a single
source of liability.
(3) better control over risk : Working under the form of a construction manager or a
design/builder, and placing both the risk and return under a single roof, the SLIM model
provides a system with less potential for conflict. As single entity with complete control
over what occurs on site, entities under the SLIM model would be able to provide
sureties with a clearer and more manageable set of risks.
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5.4.5 A Better Way to Provide Wrap-Up Insurance
With the exception of very large projects like Boston's Central Artery Project and
Logan 2000 where wrap-up has provided the owner with significant savings due to economies
of scale, most circumstances preempt the use of wrap-ups by making the choice unduly
expensive. Yet savings like this, proved on large scale projects such as the above, could be
brought down to smaller projects by diminishing the level of exposure that commercial
insurance carriers face when taking on a project. Instead of having the owner carry, both
directly and indirectly, the costs of insurance through the contracts with the designer,
contractor, or design/builder, he could have a "wrap-up" backed by this deductible reserve.
5.4.6 Leveling the Playing Field?
Using the aggregate strength of the virtual corporation, the Single Liability Insurance
Model can serve as a leveling tool. With the group increases on bonding capacity, financial
strength, and risk coverage, good (but smaller) participants can have the opportunity to go
head to head with bigger competitors in large scale projects. Still, this might lead to a
consolidation of the industry. Similar to Japan, a model like this could develop large
conglomerates which could overrun smaller competitors. While SLIM does not intend to
preempt competitive bidding, it does support a qualifications screening. By doing so, the
system could nurture the creation of powerful groups with high barriers to entry.
As many architectural innovations do, a system like the one provided by the Single
Liability Insurance Model could have a direct effect on the value system. Because of this, the
model tries to balance internal forces within the system. Yet, I do accept that a balanced value
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chain does not necessarily imply a balanced value system; -maybe this is a totally new
question ..... -
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6.1 Thesis Summary
The core hypothesis presented here is that:
A reversal in the risk aversion tendencies of construction industry participants will not
only improve a system which is failing to provide an efficient environment for the
delivery of capital projects, but also strengthen the eroded position of design
professionals in it.
In order to derive higher benefits from existing methods of delivery, it is not the methods
which must be changed (or improved), but the system in which they all operate. While
politics and "law", do play a role in the achievement of something like this, it is primarily on
our hands to support an environment conducive to change. Static allocations of project risk
have only lead industry participants to unrealistic expectations, and added to the erosion of
an industry already plagued with disappointment and disputes.
Design professionals, ever more aware of legal implications, have stepped away from
many of the services they used to provide. Legal considerations have gone over those of
business, and professionalism has been slowly obscured. Limiting services to reduce exposure
to liability, design professionals have truncated their ability to stay up to date with new
technologies. And while this is happening, outside technologies and performance
requirements continue to increase project complexity, forcing a level of professional
differentiation promoted by risk shedding that has given birth to a generation of consultants
with deep technical ability but limited scope of expertise.
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The SLIM or (Single Liability Insurance Model), is proposed as a radical departure
from current practices. Based on many of the ideas discovered through the analysis
performed using the Venture Risk Analysis Model ( or VRAM), the thesis developed a set of
guidelines that formed the foundation for what SLIM should achieve. Taking advantage of
overlapping insurance coverages which try to define a "blurry" risk allocation boundary, the
Single Liability Insurance Model puts forward a "new" way of attacking an "old" problem
with a set of very "common" tools. While the model is developed in a very schematic way, I
sincerely hope it plants seeds which will spark the imagination of those, who like me, believe
that there must be a better way.
6.2 Implications of Research
It is the purpose of this research to open the eyes of anyone reading it to new
opportunities. While firmly believing that the industry can be greatly improved, it is
important to reinforce that it still an industry full of life and potential . The following
sections point to how, where, and when we can improve the way we do things. Risk and risk
allocation, go to the very root of all the problems which the industry faces. Yet, if we want to
find better way to do things, we must first admit to the problems, before trying to find ways
of resolving them.
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6.2.1 Lawyers or Us? Are we the ones Failing the System?
Lawyers do only what we let them do. If I only get this point through, my research
has served it purpose. It is important that we all understand this, as it to our benefit (and not
theirs) to improve the system. Because it is us and not them who will benefit from better
approaches to project delivery, the responsibility to find better ways is in our hands. With
systems like the Single Liability Insurance Model, we must push towards two main goals:
6.2.1.1 Pro-Active Allocation of Risk
Risk, like matter, is neither created nor destroyed. Yet, we have the power to control
its state. Careful allocation of risk does this. When risks are pushed aside, they do not
disappear, but instead become more dangerous by becoming temporarily invisible. Risks can
many times be handled with simple strategies like choosing a lump sum contract versus a unit
priced one (or vice-versa), yet these strategies are only successful if founded on a solid
understanding of their implications. A balanced and well thought out allocation of risk relies
on the ability to work as a team. The continuous support given to the adversarial
relationships which exists today, only works to block this from happening.
6.2.1.2 Control to those better able to do so
In order to create an environment which supports team interaction, risk must be
placed in the hands of those parties best able to handle it. Mishandled risks double exposure
by giving team members a false sense of security. A failure on the part of any participant to
adequately manage risk, will inevitably affect all parties involved either in time, cost, or (in
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most instances) a combination of both. Because mishandled risks can potentially affect the
exposure of all participants in the delivery of a capital facility, risk management programs
must incorporate pro-active allocations of risk which adequately distribute not only risk, but
also return to those parties carrying the largest amount of responsibility.
6.2.2 An Opportunity to Revitalize the Industry: The SLIM Model
The Single Liability Insurance Model is a first shot at how something like this could
be achieved. In form it is nothing new, but yet in our industry it is definitely innovative. By
adopting and adapting the captive insurance concept from the other industries (like
manufacturing), the construction industry can do with insurance what it once did with project
control and computer aided design.
Insurance is a powerful risk mitigation mechanism that links the whole industry
together. Yet, even with its inherent strength, the true force comes not from reducing
insurance costs, but from giving project participants a reason to work together. With
information technology moving at a faster pace than ever, those with the will to "share" will
have the competitive edge. But why share?
Under a system like the one provided by the Single Liability Insurance Model, there are many
reasons why someone might be willing to share information and work together.
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6.2.2.1 Decreased Litigation
In an environment like the one in which the industry operates today, a system capable
of reducing the amount of litigation would be extremely welcome. SLIM, by providing a
single source of liability, gives a strong incentive to cooperate. By sharing both profits and
losses under the form of a "deductible reserve", every participant will have the best incentive
(money) to do his/her best to make sure that things go right. Under the current system there
is no incentive to cooperate. While design/build, construction management, and partnering are
beginning to explore the strength of sharing information, there is still a lot of friction to be
eliminated.
6.2.2.2 Better Control over Risk
In addition to providing a single source of liability, the model also gains in strength by
permitting a better control over risk. While insurance companies rely on the performance of
many parties all of which add to a pool of risk, under SLIM there is only one: the "reserve"
group which in essence is only one entity with a very strong interest in the overall success of
the project. Either under the form of a construction manager or a design/builder, the model
develops a central mechanism with both the technical and the financial capabilities, to assume
full control over risk.
6.2.2.3 Opening doors to Innovation
By limiting the threat of financial loss and damage to professional careers , SLIM
provides an environment conducive to innovation. While adversarial relationships have been
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the basis of a litigious environment that stifles innovation and cooperation in implementing
new technology, SLIM tries to promote just the opposite.
Firms today are loath to adopt technologies pioneered elsewhere, and as many
observers have expressed, the declining position of U.S. construction industries in global
markets is due to in part to a declining commitment to R&D in building-related industries.
The separation of responsibilities in Design-Bid-Build together with the rigid budgeting and
construction practices, discourage innovations which could reduce initial cost. By placing all
responsibility under one roof, and limiting the potential for catastrophic losses, the Single
Liability Insurance Model encourages people to look for better ways to do things, faster,
cheaper, and safer.
6.2.2.4 Sustainable Competitive Advantage
The Single Liability Insurance Model provides participants with a powerful source of
sustainable competitive advantage. SLIM enables teams to be built to offer services over a
wide variety of project types, and to do so cheaper and faster than the competition. By
diminishing litigation and insurance costs, the model places its participants in an
advantageous position. Because the creation of a " deductible reserve" is an incremental
process that could take the competition years to build, the model places high barriers of entry
to those who follow.
Owners, tired of increasing levels of litigation and construction costs, want a single
source of responsibility. For smaller organizations the provision of a single source of liability
could imply a high degree of exposure. However SLIM participants can do so under much
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less stress. By diversifying both risk and return over all of the "reserve" participants, the
model creates a natural incentive to cooperate, thus making a single source of liability not
only financially, but organizationally feasible.
6.2.2.5 Promoting Team Participation: Joint Interest in a Successful Outcome
By creating a common financial interest, the Single Liability Insurance Model is able
to induce a higher level of cooperation than would be achievable otherwise. Because of the
adversarial relations inherent in other delivery methods, there is a huge amount of friction
built into those systems. The friction created by the unwillingness to cooperate, affects
projects at all levels.
Having a better reason to work together, participants under SLIM have better
opportunities to innovate, reduce time, diminish litigation costs, and maintain longer relations
with customers. In an industry plagued with litigation, those who can control conflict will
have a strategic marketing tool which will provide them with high level of competitive
advantage.
6.2.3 An Opportunity to Strengthen A/E's Position in the Industry
Originally trained both as an architect and an engineer, the problems faced by
designers have always made me look for ways to strengthen their position. This group of
professionals, whose decisions are probably the most important in the delivery of any
project, have cornered themselves through the years by stepping away from risk. Yet, as they
have done this, their influence and participation in the decision process has proportionally
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decreased. This is something that should worry us all, since design decisions affect all aspects
of a project; physical, structural (balloon frame v. structural steel), financial( life-cycle costs,
materials, structural systems, mechanical systems, lighting systems, etc.), marketability
(appearance, location, environment, codes), and so forth.
Because of this, the Single Liability Insurance Model was designed to try and place
A/E's in a better bargaining position. Based on the idea that a well managed project is
completely dependent on a well managed design, the model addresses five major conditions
obstructing A/E participation in traditional project delivery.
6.2.3.1 The Closed Box - Nurturing Fragmentation and Adversarial Relationships
On of the biggest problems affecting A/E's today is their lack of participation in the
construction process due to its liability implications. Designers have stepped into what I call
"closed boxes" that separate them from everything going on around them. In order for A/E's
to step back into where they used to be, they have to find ways to better control risk,
without letting risk control them.
By permitting A/E's to better handle risk, the Single Liability Insurance Model
permits them to have a higher level of participation in the delivery of a project without
having the fear of a catastrophic loss. Stimulating designers to re-accept responsibilities which
where once theirs, will increase their profitability and diminish the fragmentation of their
field. Bringing A/E's as part of the "team" will not only be to their benefit but to the benefit
of all.
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6.2.3.2 Inhibited Market Responsiveness
Inhibited market responsiveness is another of the problems caused by the stepping
away from liability. In order to keep up with changing technologies and project requirements,
designers need to be involved in the process. Design, being close knitted with construction,
grows in conjunction with what is done at the site. Designers cannot expect to provide better
designs, if they are unwilling to take bigger responsibilities.
By giving away responsibilities to others such as construction management, designers
are outdating their capabilities and forcing themselves out of the industry. The
responsibilities which they give away do not disappear, but are accepted by other parties
more capable of handling them.
SLIM gives architects a tool to reverse this. Having a lower level of exposure,
designers might begin to seek to regain lost ground. They need to participate actively in the
whole process, thus becoming essential to it. Design decisions can be the key between a
successful project and a disastrous one. As the Japanese believe, "one can't be a good
designer, without first being a master-builder".
6.2.3.3 Limited Exposure to New Technology
In order to improve their services, designers need to be constantly aware of changing
technologies. The team approach proposed by the Single Liability Insurance Model gives
A/E's an opportunity to not only see new technologies, but also have a good reason to use
them. Under traditional methods designers have little incentive to share information in any
collaborative way, or accept the increased exposure potentially beneficial innovations might
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imply. By potentially benefiting everyone involved in the system, SLIM not only gives
incentives to try out new technology, but provides the support that innovative A/E's need in
order to break with traditional methods of design and construction.
6.2.3.4 A Better Negotiating Position
Strength of negotiation is a factor of two things: Control, and Professional Expertise.
Through the Single Liability Insurance Model designers get the opportunity to have a larger
share of both. Working under the "deductible reserve" an A/E can benefit from the aggregate
capabilities of the team, and get a better grip on risk. By increasing their negotiating position,
designers will be able to have increased ability to influence decisions which are of extreme
importance. Because designers have the power to determine the final form and impact of
objects which will be part of the built environment for years to come, it is imperative that
they have the capacity to influence a process which can positively (or negatively) affect the
quality of life.
6.2.3.5 Negligence Disputes Between A/E and other parties
Having a better degree of control, professional expertise, and participation in the
decision process, A/E's will be much better positioned to handle risk and manage negligence
disputes. Also adding to this is the fact that the contractor will then be on the same side.
Knowing that most claims against A/E' s come from( or as a result of) problems with the
contractor, having him on board can greatly diminish the amount of friction in the system.
Friction will not only be diminished because they have joint interests in the project, but
because the system
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promotes early interaction between the two.
6.2.4 International Competitiveness
The United States Construction industry is facing an ever increasing level of
competition in international markets. Measures need to be taken to permit U.S. firms to
compete better in those markets. The Single Liability Insurance Model provides the industry
with two substantial sources of competitive advantage.
6.2.4.1 Cost Advantage
As proved by the Massachusetts Port Authority51 , bundling project insurance can
provide a significant source of savings. Programs ( such as Logan 2000 and SLIM) which
provide insurance carriers with better and assured premium sources, can reduce insurance
costs by as a much as 40 percent, while maintaining a healthy business for commercial
carriers. With costs of insurance ranging form 10 to 20 percent of total project costs, a forty
percent reduction in insurance could imply as much as an 8 percent advantage over the
competition right from the start. While the insurance practices and restrictions on the
international market may vary, programs like these lend themselves to a wide array of
circumstances.
Cost advantage through the Single Liability Insurance model will also be the source of
a better functioning system. Adding to the direct savings achieved through lower insurance
51 Logan 2000 Project. Information provided by Maureen McDonough, Contract Administration Manager,
Massachusetts Ports Authority, March 1996
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costs, the model also permits SLIM participants (through a higher incentive to cooperate and
share information) to benefit from improved efficiency in the management and resolution of
conflicts. Having less litigation, projects will save money through claim reduction (time), a
faster resolution process (time), and diminished legal fees (time). By reducing friction, the
model can potentially reduce delivery costs by taking advantage of time otherwise lost in
unnecessary litigation.
6.2.4.2 The Virtual Organization
By harnessing the strength of an organizational form used for years in the industry,
the Single Liability Insurance Model can take construction groups one step ahead of everyone
else. With SLIM, risk and return are not the only things getting shared. While the model
definitely provides financial advantages, an even greater advantage can be extracted from its
ability to easily diversify, and thus add any required capabilities.
Captive groups don't necessarily have to be national. In fact, the model provides a
perfect tool to enhance the bringing of international participants under one roof in the
delivery of capital projects. With local expertise in the different international markets being
one of the major worries of international U.S. firms, a model like SLIM can provide a
framework to develop international conglomerates that can easily acquire local expertise
through their pool of captive participants. Having a strong participation in both risk and
return, international parties can be built on a much stronger foundation than otherwise
possible.
131
Chapter 6 Conclusions: Unrealized Potential for Competitive Advantage
6.3 Additional Research Required
The use of Self-insurance forms is nothing new in the United States. With escalating
insurance costs, and record high stock market performance, programs like the Single Liability
Model will be increasingly tried out in various sectors of the market. By examining the
organizational and risk implications of the Single Liability Insurance Model in the
construction industry, my research only lays out the plan of what needs to be done. Future
research should go deeper, and use real projects to financially model the potential savings a
system like this could provide. While some of the models effects are quite intangible, the
financial framework is not. After a detailed financial model is built for the system, future
research should then use different investment options, incentive layouts, delivery methods
and project participants. With the preliminary financial design done, added advancement will
only be reached by putting it in place. Programs like that of the Massachusetts Port
Authority (Logan 2000 e.g.), private and public insurance funds, and self insurance programs
of large corporations can serve as perfect sources of information for future research.
With technology rapidly advancing and making the world a smaller place, the
construction industry is presented with great challenges. As people begin to realize that
lawyers are neither the answer nor the cause of our problems, the industry will have no
option but to change. The construction industry is key to the development of any country. With
a strong influence over every aspect of our daily lives, designers, builders, and everyone
involved in improving our built environment has a huge responsibility to make our country
(and the world)a better place to live.
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Interview Script
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* Questionnaire is intended to serve as tool to direct the interview *
-- Questions are only a guiding framework
1. INTERVIEW SCRIPT
HYPOTHESIS: THE ASSOCIATED VALUE OF RISK, DIRECTLY
INFLUENCES A FIRM'S POSITION IN THE INDUSTRY
* How does your exposure to risk compare to other participants in the
industry?
* Do you find that your firm's risk to return ratio is well justified?
* How does your risk position affect the firm's leverage on the decision
process?
* In your experience, has reliance on outmoded allocations of project risk
and project control, lead to unrealistic expectations?
* owner disappointment?
* legal disputes?
* Are legal issues a guiding concern in the services you provide?
* Have you ever intended to expand your range of services and not
done so because of the increased legal exposure this might implicate?
* Would a clearer distribution of risk be to the advantage of your firm?
* of the client?
* of the process?
* of the product?
* How do you feel owners perceive your participation in the process?
* How would increased responsibility affect owners perception of your
firm?
* Should you intentionally insulate from liability?
* How?
* Would you be willing to undertake a bigger share of responsibility?
* Why or why not?
* Would the prospect of an increased risk to return ratio make this option
feasible?
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HYPOTHESIS: SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION TROUGH INCREASED
PARTICIPATION WILL ENHANCE A FIRM'S COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE
* Do you see marketing as an essential part of your organization?
* How is strategic marketing incorporated into your selection of
services?
* Is any research done on market trends?
* Are you currently addressing any?
* What barriers inhibit your firm from adopting a wider range of services?
* Have you ever jointly participated on initial planning with another
firm?
* Do you offer project management services?
* feasibility studies?
* constructability studies?
* cost analysis?
* What professions are more apt to do these?
* Do you feel you are addressing all of your clients needs?
* If not, why?
* How do your services compare to those of the competition?
HYPOTHESIS: RISK AVERSION INHIBITS MARKET RESPONSIVENESS
* Has pressure from exposure to claims limited your range of services?
* Have your services changed in the last years?
* Has innovation been important?
* methods, organizational, management, contractual techniques
* on any particular type of projects?
* owners?
* Are any professions better capable of doing this?
* Why?
* What is the most common source of change in your company?
competition
* strategic marketing
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* Questionnaire is intended to serve as tool to direct the interview *
l- Questios are omly a guiding framework
* What role do legal concerns play in your contractual methodology?
* Do you provide inter-disciplinary services?
* should you?
* Is your firm constrained by any statutes or regulations which limit
services you believe should be provided by you?
* Do you think you could provide a wider set of services?
HYPOTHESIS: RISK AVERSION LIMITS AME'S CAPACITY TO
ESTABLISH A STRONG NEGOTIATING POSITION
* How would you classify your strength of negotiation compared to
others involved in the decision process?
* Does this affect your capacity to work effectively?
* How do you think the typical owner perceives your services?
* To what extent should designers be involved in the process of design
and construction?
* schedule and cost analysis
* cost reduction efforts
* Life-cycle analysis
* costructability studies
* financial issues
* project safety
* Has your role been as an outside agent?
* or part of a comprehensive service?
* Has your position on any of these issues limited you ability to influence
final decisions?
* In what projects might architects be appropriate as consultants during
initial planning?
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HYPOTHESIS: THE "TYPICAL" CONTRACT SUB-OPTIMIZES THE
BUILDING PROCESS BY NURTURING AN ADVERSARIAL
ENVIRONMENT WHICH LIMITS INNOVATION AND INCREASES
COSTS
* Organizationally, how would you classify your company's decision
structure? (Centralized, Decentralized, Adhocratic )
* Is this decision structure affected by the type of project?
* Within a typical project, does risk tend to be shifted towards lowers
tiers?
* alternatives & risk association?
* Has innovation been important for your firm? (or is it better to use what
works)
* methods, materials, financial alternatives, contractual techniques,
management, organizational approach
* What professions are more skilled in the introduction of innovative
ideas?
* Has this been especially important on certain project types?
* which contractual methods have provided you with the most
flexibility?
* have you been able to repeat their success on other projects?
* Has contractual shifting of responsibility served its purpose or just led
to more litigation?
HYPOTHESIS: ARCHITECT'S CONTRACTUAL SHIELDING FROM
CONSTRUCTION RISK HAS CREATED A SERVICE GAP THAT IS
BEING FILLED BY CM'S
* What is the role of an architect in the typical Design-Bid-Build project?
* When does he come in?
* When should he?
* What is his share on construction risk?
* safety, constructability, schedule, quality, defects, third party litigation
* To what level are they concerned with financial implications?
* Do clients appreciate this?
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* Questionnaire is intended to serve as tool to direct the interview *
- Questions are only a guiding framework
* what influence does it have on owners?
* Do aesthetic concerns bias architects decisions?
* Do architects emphasize long-term planning?
* should they?
* To what extent should architects reach beyond the present scope?
* Are architect's facilitators of team integration?
* interdisciplinary understanding
* How much should the architect get involved in the construction
process?
* What are architects weaknesses?
* Financial, technological, managerial, social
* Do they facilitate team communication?
* Do they maintain project focus and effectively lead the team towards
reaching expected goals?
* To what extent are architects concerned with process proficiencies?
HYPOTHESIS: A MORE SOPHISTICATED MARKET IS PUSHING
TOWARDS THE PROVISION OF HIGH QUALITXY DESIGNS WITH
SINGLE SOURCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND SEAMLESS INTEGRATION
OF SERVICES
* How often do owners know what they want ?
* Have mismatched contracting methods been a cause for poor quality
on projects? ( GC, CM, D/B or Turnkey, Build/Lease Back)
* pricing methods ( GMP, Cost Plus, Unit price, Cost with incentive fee)
* Do you see an owner trend toward single source liability?
* Would this affect the process?
* the relationship between participants?
* design quality?
* quality of the product?
* Have you worked under a design-build arrangement?
* what was your experience?
* Was the project completed on time?
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* Was the project on budget?
* Were there any personal conflicts?
* Did conflicting interests have a negative effect on quality?
* Did you face any problems with your coverage? ( Insurance, Bonding)
* risk to return?
* What has been your experience with Construction Management?
* Has it been a positive relationship?
* On specific projects, clients?
HYPOTHESIS: PROFESSIONAL SCHOOIL S ARE NOT PROVIDING THE
INTER-DISCIPLINARY SKILLS NEEDED TO REVERSE OUTDATEDI
APPROACHES TO DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
* Has poor interdisciplinary understanding lead to conflicts which
otherwise could have been avoided?
* Should architects get involved in finance?
* Do they have the required skill to do it?
* Should they?
* What influence has designer's knowledge of constructability had on
the quality of your projects?
* Have you benefited from inter-professional understanding?
* Is it to your disadvantage to have the initial planning consultant be an
outside agent?
* Have added layers created a communication problem?
HYPOTHESIS: THE OVERBURDEN OF LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
OBSCUtRES PROFESSIONALISM AND LIMITS ADVANCEMENT
* How often does unfair risk allocation end up having detrimental effects
on project quality?
* Has this influenced your inclination towards innovation?
* How varied is your range of services?
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* Questionnaire is intended to serve as tool to direct the interview *Questions are only a guiding framnework
* Has this affected your capacity to make educated decisions?
* What kind of projects does your firm look for?
* Could this change?
* If it did, would you be able to adequately compete with others already
providing those services?
* Could you then provide them in-house?
* How does your firm keep up with changes in today's competitive
environment?
* Could some of your capabilities be outsourced as a result of this?
HYPOTHESIS: A/E'S CANNOT CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON A
MIDDLE GROUND WHICH HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
BALANCE BETWEEN RISK & RETURN ON RISK
* Have professional associations been successful in shifting risk through
contractual customization?
* Has your firm been able to reduce litigation cost as a result of
contractual customization?
* What effect has this had on the industry?
* on your firm?
* Have indemnity clauses been a positive source for shelter?
* No-Fault-Forfeitures
* How has your contracting methodology changed over the years?
* Has the adversarial relationship created by the exculpatory language
used in contracts been detrimental to project quality?
* What contract forms do you use?........AIA, EJDC, AGC, Design /Build
* Do they provide an adequate environment for team building?
* How does this influence the process?
* When are owners introduced to contractual alternatives?
* How often do owners know what they want?
* What has been your experience with added premiums for risk shifting?
* What has been the average client's reaction?
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HYPOTHESIS: CONTRARY TO THE CURRENT TREND OF RISK
AVERSION, CAREFUL ALLOCATION OF RISKS WILL NOT ONLY BE
TO THE BENEFIT OF DESIGNERS, BUT ALSO PROVIDE LOWER
EXPOSURE TO OWNERS
* How are owners introduced to risk?
* Is the development of contracts done form lawyer to lawyer, or do
owners take a pro-active approach to the problem?
* Does your firm actively approach risk ? ( opposed to just sheltering from it)
* Is there any method established for the allocation of risk associated
premiums?
* What are the choices given to them?
* Why?
* Would the opportunity cost of doing so balance the amount of risk?
* Does this give you better control over it?
* How does the typical client react to this?
* Does your typical project risk allocation differ in any way to that of the
"traditional" Design-Bid-Build contract?
* How?
HYPOTHESIS: THE PUSH FROM OWNERS TO SHED DESIGN ANT)
CONSTRUCTION PHASE LIABILITY IS WEAKENING A/E'S POSITION
IN THE INDUSTRY BY FAVORING THE PROVISION OF DESIGN
SERVICES BY THE BUILDER
* Has the number of projects decreased in the last years?
* What has been your experience on this?
* Have you ever worked with a contractor as owner?
* Under what contract?
* Was the project finished on time?
* Was the owner satisfied?
* Was design quality sacrificed for cost reduction?
* Was litigation a problem?
* How did you face the potential conflict of interests?
* For owners who want the contractor as his representative, has Design-
Build been a better option than the traditional system?
145
APPENDIX B
Venture Risk Analysis Model (VRAM)
Calculations:
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1. Owner's Risk Positioning in the Traditional Method
1.1 Degree of Exposure
Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility oAverge w
)esign Reviews 3 3.5 4
)ifferences between design criteria & 100% 3
esi3 3.5 4
rrors or Omissions revealed During
onstruction 4 4 4
rjectSieSdety 4 4 4
onstructability of Design 4
stablishment of Project Cost 3 3.5 4
4edesignif Over Budget 4
oordination of Constuction 4 4 4
'ermits and Approvals
rnvironmenta Impact Review 3 4
,oordinating with Other Work
4 4 4
:udity Control & Quality Assurance
4 4 4
ffering Subsurface Conditions
4 4 4
)esign Defects 4 4
:onstruction Defects
4 4 4
btrikes or Labor Disputes 4
Neather Conditions
atastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake
Jnidenffied Utilities Affecting Sites 3.5
nflation 4 3.5
Hazardous Waste; Environmental C ean-Up
w Encapsulation
tird Party Litigation
4 4 4
arranties for Faility Performance 4 3.5 3
Dearee of Exposure: 3.78
147
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1.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility j * * , i ver j t#
Design Reviews 2 2 2
DiTerences between design cntena & 100% 4 3 2
Design
Errors orOrnissions revealed [urnng 4 .5Construction 2
Pect Sile Safety 2 1.5 1
Gonstmrctabilty of01 Design 2 1.5 1
-stablisrinent of Project Uost 4 3 2
Redesign if Over Budget 4 2.5 1
Uoordinabon o0 Uonstruction 1 1
lemits and Approvals 3 2.5 2
Environmrental Irmpact Review 4 3 2
C.oordinating wit omther work 2 1.5 1
Quality Control & Qluality Assurance 2 1.5
Diflenng ublsurace condtions 3 2 1
Design Defects 1 1
Construction vetects 2
stoKes or Labor LDsputes 2 2 2
Weather Conditions 1 1 1
atastrophes- Fire, FooO, artquaKe 1 1 1
uniaenmiea ulmies ATrec-ng bites 1.5
Inflation 4 3.5 3
Hazardous Waste; Invironrriental Clean-Up 3 2
or Encapsulation
i mra rany Ltgation 4 3 2
Warrantes for Facilty Perfonance 3 2 1
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 2.02
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1.3 Project Complexity Factor
Project Complexity Factor: 3.18
Complexity Complexity Criticality
Factors A- Average M a
PHYSICAL 2.625
Scale Challenge 2 3
I echnology 32
ite Complexity 32
Program 3 3
TEMPORAL 3.25
Adequacy of Iime 3 4
Uontinuity 3
FINANCIAL 3.5
Budget Complexity 4
Coverage 3 4
EXTERNAL:: 33.3333
Hegulatory 3 4
Economic 3 4
bocio Political 2 4
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2. Builder's Risk Positioning in the Traditional Method
2.1 Degree of Exposure
Dearee of Exposure: 2.93
150
Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility oNem ow' Man U4 Average [ ~ t LOW Nonees si ilityi- - °·-· I
esign Reviews 4 4 4
ifferences between design criteria & 100% 4
esign
rrors or Omissions revealed During 2.5 4
onstruction 1 2. 4
Iroject Site Safety 1 2.5 4
onstructability of Design 1 2.5 4
-stablishment of Project Cost 2 3 4
Redesign if Over Budget 2 3 4
'oordination of Construction 2.5 4
ermits and Approvals 2 3 4
Environmental Impact Review 2 3 4
oordinating with Other Work 1 2.5 4
uality Control & Quality Assurance 1 2.5 4
Differing Subsurface Conditions 3 3.5 4
Design Defects 3 3.5 4
Construction Defects 1 2.5 4
Strikes or Labor Disputes 2 3 4
Neather Conditions 4 4
atastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake
Lnidentified Utilities Affecting Sites 4 3.5 3
nflation 2 3
azardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up 1 2.5 4
,r Encapsulation I 2. I_4
Third Party Litigation 2 3 4
rarranties for Facility Performance 1 2 3
Appendix: B
2.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 3.17
Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility i Average f; *
Design Reviews 1 2
Differences between design critena 100% 1 1.52
Design
Err ors  ssions revealed Dunng
Construction4 4 4
Project Site Safety 4 4 4
onstructilty of Design 4 4 4
stabliShnent of Project Cost 4 4 4
Redesign if Over Budget 3 3 3
Coorconation o0 construction 4
4 4 4
ermits and Approvals3 3 3
Environmental Impact Review 3 3 3
Goordnating witn oIer work 4 4 4
lUalty (;ontrol & Quality Assurance 4 4 4
Meinng sutsuraca Gondons 3 3.5 4
Design Detects 1 2.5 4
Gonsi-uclon Detects 4 4 4
StnKes or Labor Lsputes
Weater Conditions 1 1
(;atastropies- ire, HOoo, I=arnrquaKe 3 2.5 2
nlenled Utilities Aecng ites 2 2.5 3
Inflation 3 3 3
Hazardous Waste; Envlrornental Clean- Up
or Encapsulation 3 2.5 2
I nira rary ~lugaon 4 3.5 3
Warranties for Facility Performance 4 4 4
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2.3 Project Complexity Factor
Proiect ComDlexitv Factor: 3.18
152
Complexity Complexity Criticality
Factors 14W;i Average 4 Mdiu oW NA: 0
PHYSICAL 2.625
Scale Challenge 2 3
Technology 3 2
Site Complexity 3 2
Program 3 3
TEMPORAL 3.25
Adequacy of Time 3 4
Continuity 3 3
FINANCIAL 3.5
Budget Complexity 3 4
Coverage 3 4
EXTERNAL 3.333
Regulatory 3 4
Economic 3 4
Socio Political 2 4
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3. Designer's Risk Positioning in the Traditional Method
3.1 Degree of Exposure
Dearee of ExDosure: 3.54
153
Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility A;e Lw Average Ml: ow N:
)esign Reviews 1 2.5 4
Differences between design criteria & 100% 1 2.5 4
)esign
-rrors or Omissions revealed During
onstruction4 4 4
Drojed Site Safety 4 4 4
,onstructability of Design
-stablishment of Project Cost 3.5 4
edesign if Over Budget
oordination of Construction
permits and Approvals 3 3.5 4
Environmental Impact Review 4
oordinating with Other Work 4 4
"uality Control & Quality Assurance 3 3.5 4
)iffering Subsurface Conditions 3.5 4
esign Defects 1 2.5 4
ýonstruction Defects 4 4
Strikes or Labor Disputes
Weather Conditions 4 4
Catastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake 3.
Jnidentified Utilities Affecting Sites 3 3.5 4
nflation 3 3
lazardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up
)r Encapsulation 2.5 4
Third Party Litigation 4 4 4
Narranties for Facility Performance 3.5 4
3 3.5 4
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3.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation:
Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility • Average Noir
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Differences between design tea & 100% 4 4 4
Design
Errors or Omissions revealed During
Construction 1 1.5 2
1 1.5 2Project Site SakW 1 1.5 2
Constructabilty of Design 2 2
2 2 2
staisment o roject ost 2 2 2
Redesign if Over Budget 2 2 2
C.ooroination of Constrnction 1 1
Permits and Approvals 2 2.5 3
Environmental Impact Review 2 2.5 3
C;oordnaling will Oiler wo2
2 2 2
mity L;ontro & Quality Assurance 3 2.5 2
Urffenng Subsurface Gond tons 1 2.5 4
Iesign Detects 4
4 4 4
.onsgrucuon Uesects
1 1.5 2
StrKes or Labor Usputes
1 1 1
Weather Conditions 2
Catastrophes- -ire, Hood, EaLriuaKe 2 2.5 3
2 2.5 3
uniaenolea UlNUes A1TecUng 5ires
2 2.5 3Inflation 2 2.5 3
Hazardous waste; environmental ;lean-Up
or Encapsulation 1.52
Inira Pany ungavon 4 3.5 3
4 3.5 3
3 3.5 4
2.37
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3.3 Project Complexity Factor
Project Complexity Factor:
Complexity Complexity Criticality
Factors AverageN
PHYSICAL _ 2.625
Scale Challenge 2 3
Technology 3 2
Site Complexity 3 2
Program 3 3
TEMPORAL 3.25
Adequacy of Time 3 4
Continuity 3 3
FINANCIAL 3.5
Budget Complexity 3 4
Coverage 3 4
EXTERNAL "3333
Regulatory 3 4
3.18
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4. Partnering Effect on the A/E's Position: The Traditional Method
4.1 Degree of Exposure
Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility Low Average
Design Reviews 3 4
Differences between design criteria & 100% 2 3 4
Design
Errors or Omissions revealed During 2 3 4
Construction
rojed Site Safety 2 3 4
3onstructablity of Design 2 3 4
Establishment of Project Cost 2 3 4
Redesign i Over Budget 2 3 4
oordination of Construction
2 3 4
ermits and Approvals 2 3 4
nvironmental Impact Review
2 3 4
Coordinating with Other Work
2 3 4
Quality Control & Quality Assurance 2 3 4
Differing Subsurface Conditions 2 3 4
esign Defects
1 2.5 4
Construction Defects
2 34
Strikes or Labor Disputes 2 3 4
Neather Conditions 2 3
Catastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake
2 2.5 3
Jnidentified Utilities Affecting Sites 2 3 4
nflation 2 2.5 3
-azardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up
,r Encapsulation 2.5 4
rhird Party Litigation
2 3 4
arranties for Facility Performance 2 3 4
Decree of Exposure: 2.91
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4.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 3.33
[Note: Since the same project type will be used throughout the analysis, project complexity
calculation remains constant in all of the examples.]
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Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility Average i i
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Differences between design crtea & 100% 4 4 4
Design
Errors or missions revealed Dunng
Construction 3 2
Pqect Site Safety 4 3 2
Constructabilty of Design 4 3 2
Istabhlisriment oTlroject ost 4 3 2
Redesign if Over Budget 4 3 2
(oorlnallon oT construction 4 2.5
Perrrts and Approvals 4 3.5 3
Environmental Impact Review 4 3.5 3
Coordinating with her WorK 4 3 2
4 3 2
iuaity C, ontrol & Quality Assurance 4 3 2
UMenng subsurtace Conditons 4 4 4
Design Detects 4 4 4
Constructlon Detects 4 3
4 3 2
,tnKes or Labor Disputes 4 2.5
Weather Conditions 4 3.5 3
Catastrophes- Fire, Hood, EarflquaKe 4 3.5 3
UdentiiedaUili4es Atecing bites 3.5 3
Inflation 4 3.5 3
Hazaroous waste; Environmental uean 4u
or Encapsulation
thirda arty Litigation 4 3.5 3
Warrantes for Facilty Performance 4 4 4
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5. The Owner's Position on Design/Build
5.1 Degree of Exposure
Dearee of ExDosure: 2.00
158
Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility MIiAi man •rgi Average
)esign Reviews 1 1.5 2
ifferences between design criteria & 100% 2
esign 2 2 2
_rrors or Omissions revealed During
'onstruction 2 2 2
rojet Site Safety 2 2 2
onstructability of Design 2 2 2
Establishment of Project Cost 2 2 2
:edesign if Over Budget 2 2 2
oordination of Construction 2 2 2
ermits and Approvals 2 2 2
-nvironmental Impact Review 2 2 2
oordinating with Other Work 2 2 2
Quality Control & Quality Assurance 2 2 2
Differing Subsurface Conditions 2 2 2
Design Defects 2 2
'onstruction Defects 2 2 2
Strikes or Labor Disputes 2 2 2
Neather Conditions 2.5 2
,atastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake 2 2 2
Jnidentified Utilities Affecting Sites
2 2 2
nflation 2 2 2
lazardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up
r Encapsulation 2 2 2
rhird Party Litigation
2 2 2
arranties for Facility Performance 2 2 2
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5.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 3.33
[Note: Since the same project type will be used throughout the analysis, project complexity
calculation remains constant in all of the examples.]
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Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility N * Average L~W
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Dlfferences between design cntena & lOO 4 4 4
Design
Errors or Omissions revealed 0unng
Construction4 3 2
Projedt St Safelty 4 3 2
(;onstructablity of Design 4 3 2
Establlsrhnent ot Project (;ost 4 3 2
Redesign if Over Budget 4 3 2
Coorcinallon of (onstrucslon 4 2.5
Permits and Approvals 4 3.5 3
Environmental Impact Review 4 3.5 3
Coor•inatng with Qher WoK 4 3 24 3 2
Juality (;ontrol & Quality Assurance 4 3 2
Difenrng Subsurface on ons 4 4 4
Uesign Detects
4 4 4
,onstruci- on uerect 4 32
4 3 2
rnaKes or Labor Lsputes 4 2.5
Weather Conditions 4 3.5 34 3.5 3
(,atastropres- Hre, Hood, :afrluaKe 4 3.5 3
Urddaentlea Ullues AT'ectng tes 4 3.5
4 3.5 3Inflation 4 3.5 3
Hazardous waste; lznvlronmental (lean-up 4 3 2
or Encapsulation
inra ranry ugaon 4 3.5 3
Warranes for Facility Performance 4 4 4
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6. The Design/Builder's Position on Design/Build
6.1 Degree of Exposure
Dearee of ExDosure: 2.54
160
Risk/ D ree of Control Criticality
Responsibility NO LW e Average N
)esign Reviews 1 2.5 4
)ifferences between design criteria & 100% 1 2.5 4
)esign
-rrors or Omissions revealed During 2.5 4
3onstruction 124
rojectSite Safety 1 2.5 4
,onstructability of Design 1 2.5 4
Establishment of Project Cost 1 2.5 4
Redesign if Over Budget 1 2.5 4
,oordination of Construction 1 2.5 4
ermits and Approvals 1 2.5 4
nvironmental Impact Review 1 2.5 4
oordinating with Other Work 1 2.5 4
Quality Control & Quality Assurance 1 2.5 4
)iffering Subsurface Conditions 1 2.5 4
Design Defects 1 2.5 4
'onstruction Defects 1 2.5 4
Strikes or Labor Disputes 1 2.5 4
Neather Conditions 3 3.5 4
,atastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake 2 3 4
Jnidentified Utilities Affecting Sites
1 2 3
nflation 3 3 3
lazardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up
Dr Encapsulation
Third Party Litigation
arranties for Facily Performance 2.5 4
arranties for Facility Performance 1 2 3
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6.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 4.00
[Note: Since the same project type will be used throughout the analysis, project complexity
calculation remains constant in all of the examples.]
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Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility A rge 1,:÷ o ,
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Differences between design criteria & 100 4 4 4
Design
Errors or Or•ssions revealed iunng
Construction4 4
ProjectSi afety 4 4 4
constructabilty of Design 4 4 4
staoisment ot Projec:t (Cost 44 4
Redesign if Over Budget 4 4 4
C•oor dinat ion o f Construction
4 4 4
Perrnmits and Approvals 4 4 4
Environmental Impact Review 4 4 4
Coordinating with Other Work 4 4 4
Quality Gontrol & Quality Assurance 4 4 4
Unrenng Subsurrace Conditons 4 4 4
Design uetects 4
4 4 4
.;onstruction Defects
4 4 4
stikes or Labor Disputes 4 4 4
Weather Conditions 4 4 44 4 4
C.atastrophres- I-ire, FHood, tarquaKe 4 4 4
Unaentiiea Utilities Affecting Sites 4 4 4
Inflation 4 4 4
Hazardous waste; rnvironmenta learup 4 4 4
or Encapsulation
inir Party Liigaton 4 4 4
Warranles for Facility Performance 4 4 4
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7. The Owner's Position in Construction Management
7.1 Degree of Exposure
Degree of Exposure: 2.52
162
Risk/ Degree of Control . Criticality
Responsibility AverW.
esign Reviews 1 2.5 4
Differences between design nteara & 100% Design 1 2.5 4
Errors or Omissions revealed During Construction 1 2.5 4
Project SiteSl 1 2.5 4
onstructablity of Design 1 2.5 4
Establishment of Project Cost 1 2.5 4
Redesign if Over Budget 1 2.5 4
Coordination of Construction 2.5 41 2.5 4
Permits and Approvals 1 2.5 4
Environmental Impact Review 1 2.5 4
Coordinating with Other Work 1 2.5 4
oJully oniola K ,ually Assurance 1 2.5 4
Differing Subsurface Conditions 1 2.5 4
Design Defects 1 2.5 4
1 2.5 4
Strikes or Labor Disputes 1 2.5 4
Wealier Conditions 3.5 4
3 3.5 4
Catastrophes- Fire, HFlood, I•erthquake 2 3 4
Unidenified Utilities Affecting Sites 1 2
Inflation 2 2.5 3
Hazardous Waste; Environmental Clean-ULip or 1 2. 4
Encapsulation
Third Party Litigation 1 2.5 4
Warranties for Faclity Performance I 2
Appendix: B
7.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 4.00
Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility Merae M____~_ __  _
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Dierences between design cntena & 100% 4 4 4Design
-rrors or omissions revealed Dunng
Construction4 4 4
Project Site Safety 4 4 4
ornSFtUCtaMty of Uesgn 44 4
Establishment o P'roject 0ost 4 4 4
4 4 4
Redesign if Over Budget 4 4 4
00;oornalon o n (;oruction
4 4 4
em and Approvals 4 4 4
Environmental Impact Review 4 4 4
Coordinating with Other Work 4
Quality ontrol & Quality Assurance 4 4 44 4 4
Dvireenng bUusufface Condltions 4 4 4
esgn eet4 4
4 4 4
uonstrucuon Uenects
4 4 4
tniKes or Labor Ilsputes 4 4 4
Weather Conditions
4 4 4
.atastropres- Fire, Hood, LartMqua e 4 4 4
urvaanilea ujles Affecong blites 4 4 4
4 4 4or Encapsulation 4 4 4
i nira Panry Lgaion 4 4 4
Warranles for Facilty Performance 4 4 44 4
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8. The Construction Manger's Position
8.1 Degree of Exposure
Degree of Exposure: 2.07
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Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility r lw, Average g i , Low N
Design Reviews 1 2 3
Differences between design criteria & 100% Design 1 2 3
Errors or Omissions revealed During Consbruclon 1 2 3
Project Sh Saey 1 2 3
Constuctablty of Design 1 2 3
Estsblishment of Project Cost 1 2 3
edesign f Over Budget 1 2 3
Coordinaton of Constructlon
rm , ra 1 2 3
2 3
Envronmental Impact Review 1 2 3
oordnalng with Olher Work 1 2 3
Quality Control & Qualty Assurance 1 2 32 3
Differing Subsurface Condions 2 3
Design Deects 1 2 3
Construction Defects 1 2 3
Strikes or Labor lsputes 1 2 3
Wealher Conditons 3 3 3
Catastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earhquake 2 2.5 3
Unidentied Utlites Affecting Sites 2 3
Inflabtion 2.5
2 2.5 3
Hazardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up or
Encapsulation 1 1.5 2
1 2 3
arranties for Facilty Performance
1 2 3
Appendix: B
8.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 4.00
[Note: Since the same project type will be used throughout the analysis, project complexity
calculation remains constant in all of the examples.]
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Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility Average   Low Nn
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Differences between design criteria & 100% 4 4 4
Design
Errors or Omissions revealea During
Construction 4 4 4
Pred sAeSafety 4 4 4
Constructabiity of Design 4 4 4
Establishment o01 Project Uost 4 4 4
Redesign if Over Budget 4 4 4
Moorainalon o onstrucFon 4 4 4
Perm1ts and Approvals 4 4 4
Environmental Impact Review 4 4 4
(.;oorahnatng with Uther Work 4 4 44 4 
Quality Control & Quality Assurance 4 4 4
tenng Subsurtace Conditions 4 4 4
esign Detects 4 4 4
;onstruchon Detects 4 4 4
tnKes or Laor sputes4 4 4
4 4 4
Weather Conditions 4 4 4
atastropes- -irle, Hood, -arlrluaKe 4 4 4
Unidentiled Utilities Affecting Sites 4 4 4
Inflation 4 4 44 4 4
Hazardous waste; nviroiental Uean-up 4
or Encapsulation
nir PI-any UItgaton 4 4 4
Warranties for Facilty Performance 4 4 4
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9. The Designer's Position
9.1 Degree of Exposure
Degree of Exposure: 2.46
Risk/ Degree of Control Criticality
Responsibility Average Lw
esig hevleWS 1 2.5 4
Differences between design criteria & 100% Design 1 2.5 4
Errors or Omissions revealed Duing Construction 1 2.5 4 
Project S safty 1 2.5 4
Constuctabilty of Design 1 2.5 4
r-sauimment or rrolect ost 1 2.5 4
edesign if Over Budget 1 2.5 4
oordinaton of Consruction 1 2.5 4
Perminsts and Approvals 1 2.5 4
Environmental mpact Review 1 2.5 4
Cooroiahing wie vlner WorK 1 2.5 4
1 2.5 4
uality Control & Quality Assurance 1 2.5 4
Differing Subsurface Conditions 1 2.5 4
Design Defects 1 2.5 4
Construction Defects
1 2.5 4
ntes or ELaoor ispuqses 1 2.5 4
Wealher ondiions; 3.5 4
Catastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earlhquake 2 3 4
Unidenfied Utilties Affecting Sites 1 2 3
Inflation
2 2.5 3
Hazardous Waste; Environmenta Clean-Up or
Encapsulation 1 1.5 2
Third Party Litigation 1 2 3
arranties for Facility Performance3 1 2 3
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9.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 3.04
[Note: Since the same project type will be used throughout the analysis, project complexity
calculation remains constant in all of the examples.]
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Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility No* ,w areIS Averae Mfu L,0 N
Design Reviews 4 4 4
Differences between design cntena & 1004 4 4
Design
-Urrorsor Crssions revealed Lunng
Construction 1 2.5 4
Pject Sf Safety 1 2.5 4
Constructabilty of Design 2 3 4
0stabisi'ment of Project cost 2 3 4
Redesign if Over Budget 2 3 4
.oorlnation of Construction 1 2.5 4
Perrnmits and Approvals 2 3 4
Environmental Impact Review 2 3 4
C.oorinating w er Wok 2 3 4
ualiy 3ontrol & uality Assurance 3.5 4
JMlrenng surace onons 1 2.5 4
Leslgn Uetects 4
4 4 4
1 2.5 4
5tnKes or Labor sputes 1 2.5 4
1 2.5 4
Weather Conditions 1 2.5 4
.Gatastrophe- Hre, Hood. arlquaKe 2 3 4
2 3 4unidenti-fea UtiliIes Affecting sites 2 3 4
Inflation 2 3 4
Hazaroous waste; Envtron•inrital ulean-up
or Encapsulation 1 2.5 4
Sira Iarty utiga4on 4 4
Warranies for Facilty Performance 3 3. 4
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10. The Contractor's Position
10.1 Degree of Exposure
Decree of Exposure: 2.93
Risk/ Desree of Control Criticality
Responsibility ~_N Tg Average h Mi Low
)esign Reviews 4
)ifferences between design criteria & 100%
)esign 4 4 4
Errors or Omissions revealed During
,onstruction 1 2.5 4
roject Sie Safety 1 2.5 4
3onstructability of Design 1 2.5 4
Establishment of Project Cost 2 3 4
Redesign if Over Budget 2 3 4
oordination of Construction
1 2.5 4
ermits and Approvals 2 4
-nvironmental Impact Review 2 3 4
oordinating with Other Work 1 2.5 4
Quality Control & Quality Assurance 1 2.5 4
iffering Subsurface Conditions 3 3.5 4
Design Defects 3 3.5 4
ýonstruction Defects 1 2.5 4
Strikes or Labor Disputes 2 4
Neather Conditions 44 4
'atastrophes- Fire, Flood, Earthquake
2 3 4
Jnidentified Utilities Affecting Sites
4 3.5 3
nflation
1 2 3
-lazardous Waste; Environmental Clean-Up
>r Encapsulation 2.5 4
rhird Party Litigation
2 3 4
arranties for Facility Performance
1 2 3
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10.2 Factor of Strength in Negotiation
Factor of Strength in Negotiation: 3.17
Risk/ Participation Professional Expertise
Responsibility M1 iAverage ig h NW * i
Design Reviews 1 2 3
ifferences between design citena & 100% 1.5 2
Design
Errors or Orissions revealed Dunng
Construction4 4 4
Projedt Site Safety 4 4 4
.onstructabilly o1 leslgn 4 4 4
Lstablislnment o01 roject Gost 4 4 4
Redesign if Over Budget 3 3 3
(oorcination of Gonstructlon 4 4 44 4 
'ermlits and Approvals 3 3
Environmental Impact Review 3 3 3
Coordinating wit Other WorK 4 4 44 4 
Quality ontrol & Quality Assurance 4 4 4
DMenng Subsurface Gondions 3 3.5 4
uesign eects 1 2.5 4
Uonstrucuon elects 4 4 4
StnKes or Labor DLsputes 4 3.5 3
Weather Conditions
atastropes- re, Hood, 3 2.5 2
uradentiliea utilies Anectng Sites 2.5 3
inflation3 3
or Encapsulation 3 2.5
inira -any Ligaton 4 3.5 3
4 3.54 4
Warranies for Facilty Performance
4 4 4
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